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The Federal Common Law of Crime 
Robert C. Palmer 
I. Introduction 
The United States Constitution established a federal system, not a national 
government. States continued necessarily and by design as active and 
important centers of governmental activity. States were institutions of 
inherent authority, while the federal government by original intentt and then 
explicitly by amendment,2 was a government of only delegated powers. 
Since the federal government derived its power directly from the people and 
acted directly on individuals,3 it was decisively more powerful than the 
pre-Constitution Confederation. 4 But the Bill of Rights5 itself is evidence of 
the continued worry, pervasive until modified by the Reconstruction 
Amendments,6 that the federal government might, but should not, over-
whelm the states. 7 
The federal courts, as courts of a government of delegated powers, 
exercised specific jurisdictions.8 Even the unamended Constitution confined 
federal court jurisdiction, as with congressional powers,9 to certain areas.to 
Robert C. Palmer is Adler Fellow and Associate Professor, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary. B.A. 1970, University of Oregon; 
M.A. 1971, Ph.D. 1977, University of Iowa. 
I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Professor Stephen Presser of Northwestern Law 
School and the assistance of Cary Dier, my research assistant. 
I. See Robert C. Palmer, 'Liberties as Constitutional Provisions, 1776-1791 ', (forthcom-
ing) [hereinafter: Palmer, 'Liberties']. 
2. U.S. Const. Amend X. 
3. U.S. Const. Preface; James Madison, Journal of the Federal Convention E.H. Scott, 
ed., (Freeport, 1970) 74,411,415. 
4. Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-
constitutional History of the American Revolution 1776-1781 (Madison, 1940) 263-70. 
5. U.S. Const., Amend. I-X. 
6. U.S. Const., Amend. XIII-XV. 
7. Palmer, 'Liberties', supra note I. 
8. U.S. Const. Art. III. 
9. U.S. Const. Art. I, §8. 
10. U.S. Const. Art. III. 
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A general jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters found no place there. 
Those jurisdictions allotted to the federal courts served a federal purpose. 11 
Historians and lawyers nevertheless agree that both legislators and federal 
judges before 1800 consistently assumed that there was a federal common 
law of crime. 12 That notion, if so universally current among policy makers 
immediately after the adoption of the Constitution, would call into question 
the limited nature of the federal government. Since the Constitution had not 
delegated common law jurisdictions as such to the federal government, the 
first generation would thus have assumed that certain matters pertained to 
government, regardless of the constitutive document or the nature of the 
government. The result might well be still only a federal government, but it 
would be a federal government with powers quite difficult to define. The 
history of the supposed federal common law of crime focuses attention on 
the nature of the federal government and the federal system as originally 
conceived. 
The historiography of the federal common law of crime raises an equally 
important although perhaps more parochial concern. Various modern 
perceptions and convictions have interacted to obscure the nature of the task 
of the historical investigation of legal and constitutional phenomena. The 
first of these is the perception, grown into an obsession, that judicial 
decision-making is not objective but is permeated by social policy bia~;es. 
Judicial activity thus seems more like legislative activity. To some extent, of 
course, the insight is a self-fulfilling prophecy. If judicial activity is seen as 
indistinguishable from social policy legislation, then the judges' perception 
II. Palmer, 'Liberties', supra note I. 
12. Randall Bridwell and Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitution and the Common Law 
(Lexington, 1977) 35-51; Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 
1780·1860 (Cambridge, Mass., 1977) 9-11; Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two 
Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and the Broken Promise of Federalist 
Jurisprudence', 73 Northwestern University Law Review 26 (1978); Charles Warren, 
'New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789', 37 Harvard Law 
Review 49, 73 (1923); Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (New York, 1985) 
275-79, 298; Leonard W. Levy, 'On the Origins of the Free Press Clause', 32 
University of California at Los Angeles Law Review 177, 177-79, 208-11 (1984); 
Stewart Jay, 'Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One', 133 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review llll-113 [hereinafter: Jay, 'Origins of Federal Common 
Law']. There can be no dispute that there is, in a very limited sense, a federal common 
law of crime: traditions of interpretation of constitutional criminal rights. As used here, 
however, federal common law of crime refers to the existence of an inherent common 
law authority rather than an express constitutional mandate for either the jurisdictional 
grant or for the substantive law to be applied in criminal cases. Federal power within 
the District of Columbia, while it was considered to include common law authority, is 
distinct from other areas of the federal common law of crime. United State!; v. 
Hammond, 26 F. Cas.96 (C.C.D.C. 1801)(No. 15,293); United States v. Lindsay. 26 
F. Cas. 971 (C.C.D.C. 1805) (No. 15,602); United States v. Herbert, 26 F. Cas. 284 
(C.C.D.C. I836)(No. 15,354); United States v. Crandell, 25 F. Cas. 684 (C.C.D.C. 
1836)(No. 14,885) [seditious libel for distribution and publication of anti-slavery 
pictures]. See George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, History of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, Volume II: Foundations of Powers: John Marshall, 1801-15 
(New York, 1981) 643-44 [hereinafter: Hist. S.C.]. 
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of their task alters and confirms the propriety of such judicial legislation. 
The insight remains valid, however, even without that effect. The problem 
it presents for historical investigation is that the emphasis on judicial 
discretion and law-making capacity makes it seem unlikely to the sophisti-
cated researcher that in the individual case judges were simply applying the 
law: the precisely legal base of their activity then receives insufficient 
attention. 
A second modem perception has devalued constitutional language. As the 
federal government has grown in the twentieth century, it has become 
increasingly difficult to relate governmental structures and powers to the 
original Constitution. Arguably, whether necessary or not, or desirable or 
not, the federal government is operating outside the bounds permitted by the 
Constitution. 13 But lawyers, judges, and historians, each with their own 
interests, maintain the validity of the link to the eighteenth century 
Constitution, ultimately deriving authority from some textual basis. But the 
relationship is often tenuous. Explanations focus on the under-specificity of 
constitutional language. 14 Constitutional language is often capable of 
varying constructions. 15 But the way in which modem courts have redefined 
words to justify seemingly necessary powers has made the task of consti-
tutional construction very difficult and the meaning of constitutional 
language problematic. The result for historical investigation is that histori-
ans talk about 'open-ended' provisions and decline to undertake analysis of 
early constitutional ideas in relationship to various constructions of consti-
tutional textual meanings. We talk more about 'constitutional ideas' or 
'jurisprudence' 16 than we try to figure out how they derived their decisions 
from the text. But this reluctance is misleading, for from the beginning 
constitutional matters were decided formalistically . 17 
The third modem notion is the importance of relating legal and constitu-
tional history with social and political history. Doctrinal analysis undertaken 
in isolation from the social and political context results not in history, but in 
anachronism. More to the point, however, legal history will not contribute 
to the general historical enterprise unless its specialists point out its 
relevance and in an idiom understandable to historians generally. That 
13. ThP. most striking instance is the extension of the interstate commerce power to the 
conditions of manufacturing. While the appropriate boundaries of commerce are hard 
to define, ordinary usage would never include everything now regulated as commerce. 
14. For a convenient summary, see Frederick Schauer, 'An Essay on Constitutional 
Language', 29 University of California at Los Angeles Law Review 797 (1982). 
15. See Robert C. Palmer, 'The Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughter-
House, Cruikshank, and the Fourteenth Amendment', 1984 University of Illinois Law 
Review 739. 
16. See Stephen B. Presser and Becky Bair Hurley, 'Saving God's Republic: the 
Jurisprudence of Samuel Chase', 1984 University of Illinois Law Review 771; Jay, 
'Origins of Federal Common Law', supra note 12 at 1054-65. 
17. See Morton J. Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, supra note 12 at 255-56. 
270 Law and History Review 
necessity, seriously accepted by modem legal historians, de-empha~;izes 
technical arguments and directs attention away from the precisely legal 
content of decisions and toward the social and political context. Legal and 
constitutional history increasingly tends to devolve into explicating how the 
law reflects various social movements. 18 That tendency ignores the doctrinal 
side of the field which is the core of the intellectual and bureaucratic !igor 
that makes the law something of a semi-independent force in society .19 
All three of these factors are valid and even pressing insights for the legal 
historical venture. But they reinforce each other too greatly. If the judicial 
enterprise is fundamentally legislative and bound to a judge's social policy 
biases, then legal cases are merely political and are illustrative of general 
political movements. If there is no set meaning to constitutional language, 
then the meaning the courts ascribe to the words are not actually a following 
of original intent, but the implementation of a political platform. And if one 
accepts the realist notion of judicial activity and the dubiousness of arriving 
at an 'objective' meaning of constitutional language, then the legal historian 
easily talks the idiom of the general historian. In proper measure, all this is 
not only acceptable but necessary. 
The overemphasis on these insights has undercut historical creativity and 
accuracy. A general historian could put a legal case in its social and political 
context. The specific expertise of the legal historian should allow him to 
construct the intellectual framework of the judges in relationship to the law. 
The basic task is a rigorous analysis of the cases, attempting to understand 
the document on its own terms. Without care for the individual case,. the 
relevant context cannot be ascertained. In constitutional areas, the impera-
tive question then is whether the cases can fit coherently into some 
understanding of the Constitution. For the early period, the presumption 
should be that they can. Social policy biases might explain why a particular 
understanding of the language was more attractive. But personal convictions 
and ulterior motives need not undermine the rigor of the decisions. Social or 
political movements may indeed create a new context that will dictate an 
alteration in constitutional constructio11, but so can prior legal determina-
tions that create a different dialectic within the law itself. It should not be a 
matter of dogma that changes are solely legal; neither should it be dogma 
that legal changes are purely social. Only a foolhardy historian would 
18. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (New York, 1973) 10 ('This 
book treats American law, then, not as a kingdom unto itself, not as a set of rules and 
concepts, not as a province of lawyers alone, but as a mirror of society. It takes nothing 
as historical accident, nothing as autonomous, everything as relative and molded by 
economy and society. This is the theme of every chapter and verse.') This extreme 
view, increasingly characteristic of American legal history, contrasts sharply with 
English legal history. See S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law 
(Toronto, 2nd ed., 1981); Robert C. Palmer, 'The Feudal Framework of English Law', 
79 Michigan Law Review 1130; Robert C. Palmer, The County Courts of Medieval 
England, 1150-1350, (Princeton, 1982) 174-262. 
19. Robert C. Palmer, The Whilton Dispute, 1264-1380: A Social-Legal Study of Dispute 
Settlement in Medieval England (Princeton, 1984) 3-5, 210-20. 
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maintain that politics played no role in judicial decisions; it should seem 
similarly foolhardy to assume that doctrine played no role. 
The historiography of the federal common law of crime presents just such 
a problem. The commentators on the subject are learned; they are also 
dedicated to searching out primary sources. 20 The defect is neither in 
scholarly attainment nor dedication. Absorption with extensive research has 
led to neglect of intensive documentary analysis and scant consideration of 
textual constitutional justification for early constitutional decisions. In a 
different way, the problem is even more simple and rests in the assumption 
that legal opinions are easily understood. The assumption, once stated, 
would always be rejected. But for a lawyer whose stock in trade is legal 
analysis or for an historian of the law who consumes his life in reading 
cases, mastery of the idiom produces an easy confidence in interpreting the 
individual case. That confidence can produce myopia as well as breadth, 
carelessness as well as originality. 
This article is not an extensive study, but an intensive study that examines 
the evidence for an early federal common law of crime and reconstructs the 
constitutional basis of the early statutes and cases. The standard accounts of 
the subject underlie much of my understanding of the cases and have proven 
immensely helpful, but they remain deficient. The drafting of the Judiciary 
Act of 178921 is normally taken to indicate that the first Congress believed 
that there was a federal common law of crime. 22 Since seditious libel is a 
common law crime23 and the First Congress likewise drafted the first 
amendment,24 the implications of that historical belief would affect speech 
and press rights. 25 But the Judiciary Act demonstrates no such belief. Both 
the drafting of the Act and the accompanying congressional debate indicate 
that Congress mandated the federal courts jurisdiction over offenses under 
the law of nations without any congressional authorization.26 This view 
coincides with a strict construction of the Constitution;27 Congress directly 
20. See Stephen B. Presser, 'Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12; Stewart Jay, 'Origins of 
Federal Common Law', supra note 12; and Julius Goebel, Jr., History of the Supreme 
Court of the United States:Volume 1. Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 (New York, 
1971) 625-33 [hereinafter: Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C.]. 
21. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, I United States Statutes at Large 73-93 [hereinafter: 
Stats]. 
22. See supra note 12. 
23. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 17-18. 
24. U.S. Const. Amend I. 
25. Levy, 'On the Origins of the Free Press Clause', supra note 12; David Anderson, 'The 
Origins of the Press Clause', 30 University of California at Los Angeles Law Review 
455; William T. Mayton, 'Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of 
Expression', 84 Columbia Law Review 9!. 
26. See text at notes 49-62 infra. 
27. See text at notes 62-65 infra. 
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mandated state, not federal, common law. 28 The first Congress did not 
create, condone, or assume a federal common law of crime. 
Like Congress, the federal courts did not assume the existence of a federal 
common law of crime. They did not hesitate to punish offenses against the 
law of nations not yet defined by Congress. In such matters, however, they 
derived jurisdiction from the Constitution and from statute; and the law they 
applied was state, not federal, common law.29 Moreover, the federal 
judiciary was sensitive to the problem of judicial legislation and referred 
reflexively to state law-state constitutions and cases-in line with a ~:trict 
understanding of the rules of decision clause of the Judiciary Act.3° Only 
after Jay's term as chief justice did the problem of a federal common law of 
crime properly surface. And only with Marshall was the rules of decision 
clause narrowed to apply only in civil suits.3' 
The claim that there was a federal common law of crime, when it did 
arise, did not derive from the assumptions of 1789. Two cases altered the 
judiciary's approach to federal jurisdiction. Wiscart v. Dauchy32 made 
derivation of any jurisdiction for federal circuit or district courts from the 
Constitution suspect.33 Worrall34 questioned the advisability of relying on 
state law, focusing on the consequent inconsistency in federal court 
practice.35 Given those two decisions, the judiciary could choose either to 
follow a properly federal common law or else insist on federal statutes to 
exercise those jurisdictions in which they had formerly relied on state law. 
They chose to rely on federal statutes, so that the propriety of a federal 
common law of crime, while not yet a dead-letter, was certainly dubious 
prior to United States v. Hudson and Goodwin. 36 
The early history of Congress and of the Judiciary provide no basis for a 
federal common law of crime and thus no support for vast federal implied 
powers that negate the notion of a limited federal government. Congress 
dealt seriously with its constitutional mandate and was considerate of the 
demands of federalism. Federal courts accepted and worked under the 
mandates of the Judiciary Act and of the Constitution. The argument 
concerning the federal common law of crime was the result of new problems 
presented and old approaches ruled out. 
The resolution was not in favor of common law, but rather an insistwce 
28. See text at notes 187-93 infra. 
29. See text at notes 170-86, 204-215 infra. 
30. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §34; I Stats. 73, 93. See text at notes 187-200 infra. 
31. See text at note 188 infra. 
32. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796). 
33. See text at notes 253-67 infra. 
34. United States v. Worrall, 29 F. Cas. 774. 
35. See text at notes 317-18 infra. 
36. II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
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on statutory authority. The emphasis on statutes explains the passage of the 
Sedition Act, 37 itself unconstitutional: 38 there was agreement that a federal 
common law was improper. But that insistence on statutes, while perhaps 
jurisprudentially more satisfying, was not more constitutionally mandated 
than the early reliance on state common law. 
II. The Judiciary Act of 1789 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 established the federal court system. Since it 
was the work of the First Congress, the Act, together with the congressional 
debate surrounding its adoption, are the best post-ratification sources for 
original intent relative to a federal common law of crime. Neither source 
provides any evidence that Congress believed there was a federal common 
law of crime. The evidence does indicate a constitutionally justifiable grant 
over crimes under the law of nations not previously defined by statute. That 
jurisdiction, however, is not equivalent to the assumption of a federal 
common law of crime. 
Sections 9 and 11 of the act are most relevant to common law criminal 
jurisdiction; they provide for the jurisdiction of the federal district and 
circuit courts. Section 9 states that 'the district courts shall have, exclusively 
of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offenses that shall be 
cognizable under the authority of the United States, committed within their 
respective districts, or upon the high seas' .39 Section 11 similarly gave 
circuit courts authority over crimes and offenses 'cognizable under the 
authority of the United States' .40 
The working draft differs from the Judiciary Act in the crimes and 
offenses subject to prosecution in the federal courts. 41 The draft gave the 
federal courts a more limited jurisdiction. There, matters cognizable under 
the authority of the United States had also to have been defined by law. The 
appropriate portions of the draft read 'cognizable under the authority of the 
United States and defined by the laws of the same' .42 The limiting clause 
was removed during the process of legislative revision. 
This alteration is indicative of intention, but such an historical deduction 
is dangerous. Warren asserted that the only reasonable deduction was that 
Congress disagreed with the original drafters and fully intended for the 
district and circuit courts 'to take jurisdiction over common law crimes' .43 
37. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, I Stats. 596. 
38. David Anderson, 'The Origins of the Press Clause', supra note 25 at 521-23. 
39. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§9 & II, I Stats. 73,76-77,78-79. 
40. Ibid. 
41. Charles Warren, 'New Light', supra note 12 at 49-51. 
42. Ibid. at 73, 77. 
43. Ibid. at 51, 73. 
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He assumed that intention to have included crimes both at common law and 
under the law of nations. 44 Bridwell and Whitten, although willing to 
challenge Warren's other deductions from the draft bill,45 agree that 
Congress intended to give the courts jurisdiction over common law crimes 
and admiralty.46 Goebel took an opposing position, supposing that Congress 
eliminated the limiting clause as redundant, since there was a bill4"1 in 
progress to define crimes against the United States. 48 Nevertheless, the 
omission of the clause most easily relates to a jurisdictional grant of crimes 
not defined by Congress. 
The conclusions drawn from the omission of the limiting clause in §9 and 
§II , however, are overbroad. The draft bill and the Judiciary Act were not 
drawn in a vacuum. The language certainly mandates a broad grant: of 
undefined substantive law. One cannot conclude that Congress granted 
jurisdiction over common law crimes along with judicial authority in the law 
of nations. 
The clause omitted in the final version of the act contained constitutional 
language. The Constitution gave Congress the power '[t]o define and punish 
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and Offenses against the 
Law of Nations' .49 This clause is the only constitutional power to 'define' 
and the only place at which the Constitution mentions 'offenses'. The 
Constitution, for instance, delegates to Congress the power '[t]o exercise 
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever' for the seat of the govem-
ment,50 '[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws 
on the subject of Bankruptcies' ,51 and to 'make all needful Rules and 
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the 
United States' .52 But Article I, §8, cl.IO is the only power 'to define'. 
The congressional committee probably consulted the Constitution in 
44. Ibid. at 73, 77. 
45. Randall Bridwell and Ralph Whitten, The Constitution and the Common Law, supra 
note 12 at 38. 
46. Ibid. at 38. 
47. See Act of April 15, 1790, ch. 9, I Stats. 112-19. 
48. Julius Goebel, Jr. Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 496. Presser points out that the meaning 
of the word 'laws' in §34 of the Judiciary Act included statutory and common law and 
that the word 'laws' in the limiting clauses in the draft of §9 and §II could logically 
carry the same meaning (although it need not), so that the draft bill itself might have 
carried the implication that there was a federal common law. Stephen B. Presser, 'Tale 
of Two Judges', supra note 12 at note 170. That hypothesis is unlikely, primarily 
because the limiting clause, referring to defining laws, seems more readily to refc:r to 
statutes. As Presser's hypothetical language seems to indicate, there is no reason why 
the word 'laws' would be used consistently in the Judiciary Act. 
49. U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 10. 
50. U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 17. 
51. U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 4. 
52. U.S. Const. Art. IV, §3, cl. 2. 
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drawing up the Judiciary Act. The First Congress in other matters felt bound 
by Constitutional language.53 The clause 'and defined by the Laws of the 
[United States]' most easily relates to the similar constitutional provision. 
The wording of the clause in the draft bill suggests that the committee 
intended to exert its definitional power over piracy and the law of nations 
pursuant to Art. I §8, cl. 10. Its omission should perhaps indicate nothing 
further. 
The omission of the limiting clause could reasonably relate only to piracy 
and the law of nations. Defining all offenses against the law of nations 
would have been imprudent. The First Congress had to provide for duties on 
imports (with their foreign policy implications) and for tonnage,54 estab-
lishment of executive branch departments,55 the collection of revenue and 
the sale of territorial lands,56 compensation for governmental officials, 
including the president, the justices, and themselves, 57 and Indian treaties.58 
They also had to debate the location of the permanent seat of government, 59 
and submit the Bill of Rights to the states.60 That was a substantial burden, 
even without the establishment of the judiciary and its powers. The Senate 
did provide for various offenses against the United States, including piracy 
and those infractions of the law of nations incurred by offering violence to 
public ministers. 61 While the definition of piracy was not onerous, a 
53. Congress carefully debated the demands of constitutional language in establishing the 
executive department as a whole and the Department of Foreign Affairs. I Annals 
368-83, 455-585. Moreover, proper constitutional construction was debated. Ibid. at 
461, 467, 473, 486, 503, 514, 536, 573-74, 829. In the consideration of the Judiciary 
Act, the role of the state courts in enforcing the Constitution was the occasion for 
construing the Constitution. Ibid. at 813-18. 
54. I Annals 102-21, 123-42, 144-70, 173-231,234-47,251-65,271-318,324-28,330-66, 
409-11,416,454-55,585-91,608-10,615-19. (Approximately thirty-three working 
days.) 
55. Ibid. at 368-97, 455-585, 590-608, 611-15, 619, 666-69. (Approximately fifteen 
working days.) 
56. Ibid. at 367-68, 411-24, 450-53, 619-32, 665-66. (Approximately twenty-one working 
days.) 
57. Ibid. at 232-3, 632-37, 643-58, 675-92, 785-86, 899-903. (Approximately twelve 
working days.) 
58. Ibid. at 687-703, 763-66. (Approximately four working days.) 
59. Ibid. at 786-92, 835-87, 892, 895-98, 905-12, 920-27. (Approximately ten working 
days.) 
60. Ibid. at 248-51, 424-50, 660-65, 703-63, 766-78. (Approximately eleven working 
days.) Miscellaneous matters, such as consideration of amendments to several different 
bills, establishment of procedure, and various minor bills consumed approximately 
another 28 days. 
61. Ibid. at 834. The bill finally became law in the second session of the First Congress. 
Act of April30, 1790, ch. 9, I Stats. 112-19. In that act, §§25-28 concern matters 
under the law of nations, but the provisions speak about the law of nations as already 
subsisting, citing merely various violations against that law. Legislation likewise 
referred to the law of nations as a guide. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §13, I Stats. 
at 80 ('And shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against 
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definition of all offenses against the Jaw of nations would have been very 
time-consuming. 
Allowing the judiciary to punish offenses against the law of natrions 
without prior congressional definition was congruent with constitutional 
original intent. 62 The different phrasing of Article I, §8, cl. 10,63 indicated 
ambassadors ... as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the law of 
nations.') Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §28, I Stars. at 118 ('That if any person shall 
violate any safe-conduct or passport . . . or in any other manner infract the law 
of nations, by offering violence to the person of an ambassador or other public: 
minister .... ')Act. of March 3, 1819, §5, 3 Stats. 513. See also United States v. 
Howard, 26 F. Cas. 390 (C.C.D. Pa. 1818)(No. 15,404); United States v. Chapel:;, 25 
F. Cas. 399 (C.C.D. Va. 1819)(No. 14,782). 
62. A Pennsylvania district attorney in 1806 argued this view, saying: 'The civil law being 
considered, therefore, as the law of the admiralty, remains under the general delegation 
of judicial power to the courts of the United States, unless it is expressly modified by 
statute'. United States v. McGill, 26 F. Cas. 1088, 1089 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806)(No. 
15,676). Justice Washington followed on with a comment that may have wider 
implications but was properly concerned only with admiralty and offenses committed 
on the high seas. 
The judicial act gives jurisdiction to the circuit court, of 'all crimes and offences, 
cognizable under the authority of the United States' .... There are, undoubtedly, 
in my opinion, many crimes and offences against the authority of the Unit1:d 
States, which have not been specially defined by law; for, I have often decided, 
that the federal courts have a common law jurisdiction [note: not necessarily a 
complete jurisdiction] in criminal cases: and in order to ascertain the authority of 
the United States, independent of acts of congress, against which crimes may be 
committed, we have been properly referred to the constitutional provision, that 
'the judicial power shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdictior,·. 
But still the question recurs, is this a case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, 
within the meaning of the constitution? The words of the constitution must be 
taken to refer to the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of England . . . but no 
case, no authority, has been produced to show, that in England such a prosecution 
would be sustained . . . as a cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiciton . . . . 
Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that the present is a case omitted in the 
law, and that the indictment cannot be sustained. It is some relief to my mind, 
however, that I have no doubt of the power of congress to provide for such a case. 
It is true, that it would be inconsistent with common law notions to call it murder; 
but congress, exercising the constitutional power to define felonies on the high 
seas, may certainly provide, that a mortal stroke on the high seas, wherever the 
death may happen, shall be adjudged a felony. 
Ibid. at 1090. Madison, writing during the ratification process of the Constitution, 
thought that the definition of piracies 'might perhaps without inconveniency, be left to 
the law of nations; though a legislative definition of them, is found in most municipal 
codes. A definition of felonies on the high seas is evidently requisite.' The Federalisl 
Papers by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay No. 42 (New York, 
1982). Madison's mild concern here related to felonies, only one portion of the Article 
I §8, cl. 10 trilogy of piracies, felonies and offenses against the Law of Nations. See 
also United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822)(No. 
15,551). See note 63 infra. 
63. See text at notes 28-31 supra. Marshall's opinion was that the definitional power in 
regard to piracy did not concern the law of nations. He argued that there were two kinds 
of piracy. Piracy under the law of nations could neither be increased nor diminished by 
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that the Constitutional Convention had not considered the federal courts 
limited to operation by virtue of statutes.64 The power to define was the 
power to adjust, a power properly exercised only occasionally and not 
always in advance of judicial action. The courts were possessed of admiralty 
jurisdiction, but Congress could define in its own way the various crimes if 
it felt the courts going awry. Apart from the wording, the First Congress was 
sensitive not only to federalism but also to separation of powers concems.65 
an individual nation. But a nation could by legislative definition establish its own law 
of piracy. This latter kind of piracy was, in his opinion, the subject of Article I, §8, cl. 
10. '[T]his clause of the Constitution cannot be considered, as affecting acts which are 
piracy under the law of nations.' I 0 Annals 607. See also ibid. at 599. Marshall at this 
point was convinced of the constitutionality of the sedition laws. He reasoned that 
'cases arising under the Constitution' must mean cases arising under the 'common or 
unwritten law', which protected all governmental officials from libel. Since the judicial 
power extended to that subject, he reasoned, Congress had the power to legislate to give 
effect to that power. John Marshall, Address of the Minority in the Virginia Legislature 
to the people of that state, containing a vindication of the constitutionality of the Alien 
and Sedition laws (1799) 12. The inference from a court jurisdiction to a congressional 
power is of course flawed. He also argued that the presence of the first amendment 
indicated such a governmental power (ibid.), that punishing licentious publications was 
not a restriction of the freedom of the press (ibid. at 13), and that 'the will of the 
majority must prevail, or the republican principle is abandoned, and the nation is 
destroyed'. Ibid. at 14. His reasoning on piracy is more respectable than his reasoning 
on the first amendment. 
64. After several alterations to federal court jurisdiction, the provision was altered to 'that 
the jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under the national laws; and to such 
other questions as may involve the national peace and harmony'. Madison, Journal, 
supra note 3 at 79. The dichotomy there between cases arising under national laws and 
cases involving national peace and harmony indicate a non-statutory base for the latter. 
That provision was then altered, not affecting that dichotomy: 'Resolved, That the 
jurisdiction of the National Judiciary shall extend to cases arising under laws passed by 
the General Legislature; and to such other questions as involve the national peace and 
harmony.' Ibid. at 448. The report of the committee of detail, relating to the matters 
that became Article I, §8, cl. 10, suggested: 'To declare the law and punishment of 
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and the punishment of counterfeiting 
the coin of the United States, and of offences against the law of nations.' Ibid. at 454. 
It is at least interesting that counterfeiting was here included with the law of nations 
provisions and likewise formed one of the early problems. The final form can be seen 
evolving later on. Ibid. at 705, 710, 759, 753. 
65. For federalism, the most sensitive area was the role that the states would have in 
enforcing the U.S. Constitution. I Annals 215, 797-833. In questions of citizenship, 
state law was considered decisive. Ibid. at 404-08. Perhaps the most striking example 
of the sensitivity of the First Congress to the rights of states was the refusal of the 
Senate to concur in the proposed amendment to restrict states in the areas of religion, 
speech and press, and trial practice originally proposed by Madison. Ibid. at 435. The 
Judiciary Act as well as the succeeding provision for regulating the process of the 
federal courts mandated a certain adherence to state law and practice. Act of Sept. 24, 
1789, ch. 20, §§29 & 34, I Stats. 73, 88, 92; Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, §2, Ibid. 
at 93-94. See also Charles Warren, 'New Light', supra note 6, 53-63; Julius Goebel, 
Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 27 at 458,471, 473. See United States v. Coit, 25 F. Cas. 
489 (D.C.D. N.Y. 1812)(No. 14,829) ('He shewed, not only from the acts of congress 
particularly applicable to this subject, but from a view of the whole judiciary system of 
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Congress was thus reluctant to intrude on other branches of government or 
to shirk its own responsibilities. Congress did not debate the propriety of 
delegating a legislative power to the judicial branch. Such a debate would 
have been expected when considering the Judiciary Act §9 and § 11 had the 
definitional power been considered a power necessarily exercised in advance 
of judicial action. 
Federal jurisdiction over piracy and the law of nations was the least 
contentious jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts. Livermore stated that 
the only reason why inferior federal courts should be established wa8 to 
enforce the law of nations. Even so he would have preferred the state courts 
to have functioned as the inferior federal courts.66 Smith assumed agreement 
in Congress to the law of nations jurisdiction: 'But to what objects do the 
district courts extend? To admiralty causes and trials for piracy committed 
on the high seas. Gentlemen have conceded that the district courts shall have 
jurisdiction of these cases-to offences against the United States. ' 67 Smith 
then extended such offenses to breaches of revenue laws and offenses 
committed on the high seas.68 Congressman Jackson, in arguing that state 
courts could function as federal admiralty courts as they had prior to the 
Constitution by congressional mandate, did not dispute the necessity for 
having some kind of inferior court for such matters. 69 Thus, although 
Congress debated institutional structure, they agreed on the federal character 
of the law of nations. 
Congress was unconcerned about federal court application of admiralty 
and maritime law not congressionally defined. 70 Immediately after the 
the United States, that it was the intention of congress to conform the proceedings of 
the United States courts as nearly as possible to those of individual states respectively.' 
Ibid. at 490.) For separation of powers, see note 53 supra. 
66. I Annals, 797, 821. Livermore's primary objection was to the establishment of federal 
inferior courts with jurisdiction other than admiralty/maritime/law-of-nations matters. 
There is a certain amount of ambiguity in Livermore's speech that is clarified by 
Smith's succeeding speech. Ibid. at 798, 800. 
67. Ibid. at 799. Smith summarized Congress's position in a similar fashion: 
But some gentlemen are of opinion that the district court should be altogeth•!r 
confined to admiralty causes; while others deem it expedient that it should be 
entrusted with a more enlarged jurisdiction; and should, in addition to admirahy 
causes, take cognizance of all causes of seizure on land, all breaches of impost 
laws, of offences committed on the high seas, and causes to which foreigners or 
citizens of other States are parties. The committee are now to decide between the:;e 
two opinions. 
68. Ibid. at 799-800. 
69. Ibid. at 831. 
70. The concern about prior congressional definition can be considered either a federalism 
or a separation of powers problem. Horwitz has noted the lack in the early days of a 
separation of powers argument against the common law of crimes. He found the 
federalism argument to be without foundation, citing James Sullivan. Horw.itz's 
paraphrase of Sullivan is worth examining: 'James Sullivan of Massachusetts under-
stood that the question of common law jurisdiction involved no special constitutional 
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passage of the Judiciary Act, Congress passed 'An Act to regulate Processes 
in the Courts of the United States', section 2 of which specified that 'the 
forms and modes of proceedings in causes of equity, and of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction, shall be according to the course of the civil law' .71 To 
the extent that form dictates substance or result, the act displayed no 
reluctance to have the federal courts function like other admiralty courts. 
Furthermore, in 1792 the second Congress modified the previous act to 
allow for discretionary modifications by the inferior federal courts or 
regulations provided by the Supreme Court. 72 Both the First and Second 
Congress were content to allow the federal courts to work in admiralty law 
without prior definition by Congress. 
While Congress had no qualms about the Jaw of nations, the same was not 
true in regard to the common Jaw. Congressman Baldwin remarked in the 
second session of the First Congress that, although the several states had 
adopted the common Jaw, 'we have not adopted the common law, and 
therefore are free from its restraints'. 73 He concluded that Congress was not 
affected by any common law rule excluding aliens from holding real 
estate. 74 Baldwin's remark about the common law is not at odds with the 
views of others in the First Congress. 
Congressman Ames, however, made a remark about the common law that 
might easily be misconstrued: 
The branches of the judicial power of the United States are the admiralty jurisdiction, the 
criminal jurisdiction, cognizance of certain common law cases, and of such as may be 
given by the statutes of Congress. 75 
'Certain common law cases' nevertheless, in terms denies a general 
common Jaw jurisdiction. Article III powers necessitate handling certain 
common Jaw matters under diversity jurisdiction.76 Ames perhaps included 
difficulties, for all that it required was that federal common law jurisdiction be limited 
to those substantive crimes over which Congress had legislative power.' Sullivan made 
that statement in 1801. Morton J. Horwitz, Transformation of American Law, supra 
note 12 at 10. Sullivan's thought, however, was hardly that innocuous. In the same year 
he wrote that the federal judiciary properly had criminal jurisdiction over anything 
detrimental to the aims set forth in the Preface of the United States Constitution without 
any statutory definition. James Sullivan, The History of Land Titles in Massachusetts 
(New York, 1972, reprint of 1801 ed.) 344. Regardless of the thrust of Sullivan's 
thought, that portion of Horwitz's analysis derives from writers in and after the year 
1800 and thus not in the decisive first five years of the federal judiciary. 
71. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, §2, I Stats. 93-94. 
72. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, §2, I Stats. 276. 
73. I Annals 1071. The debate at that point concerned whether or not an alien could hold 
real estate situated in the United States. 
74. Ibid. 
75. Ibid. at 807. 
76. U.S. Canst. Art. III, §2, cl. I. Article III jurisdiction in diversity envisaged the 
application of state law. Little thought had yet been given to the differences among the 
common laws of the various states. It is thus wrong to say precisely that Congress 
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foreign consuls as proper subjects of common law adjudication in federal 
courts. 77 But neither Ames nor any other congressman said anything 
indicating a belief in a general federal common law. 
The First Congress assumed the lack of a federal common law. James 
Madison, considering a contested election, argued that Congress should be 
guided by the laws and constitution of the relevant state so far as they would 
help, and only thereafter have recourse to general principles. 78 Richard Henry 
Lee agreed. 79 The debate on the Judiciary Act was extended by a controv•;!rsy 
over whether the state courts would serve as adequate inferior federal 
courts. 80 Section 34 of the Judiciary Act directed the courts to follow ~:tat{: 
law in trials at common law except where otherwise dictated by the Con·· 
stitution, treaties, or federal statutes. 81 And in the immediately succeeding 
statute, the forms of writs and executions, with minor necessary exceptions, 
were directed to be made in suits at common law 'in each state respectively 
as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same'. 82 Just as 
reference to admiralty law or the law of nations seemed sufficiently explicit 
to avoid danger in the courts, so also did the direction to the federal courts 
to follow state law. No one in the First Congress said anything that would 
even contemplate the existence of a general federal common law. 
A federal common law of crime is even less likely than a federal 
common law in civil matters. The immediate implication of a federal 
common law of crime would be seditious libel prosecutions. Leonard 
Levy in 1960 argued that first amendment freedom of speech and press 
was congruent with Blackstone's definition: 83 freedom from prior re-
mandated that federal courts apply state common law regardless of the inconsist·~ncy 
that would entail. But the accommodations continually made for the states, the 
legislative history of §34 of the Judiciary Act, and early practice indicate that 
application of state common law was the closest response to congressional intent 
possible. Charles Warren, 'New Light', supra note 12 at 86-88. 
77. U.S. Const. Art. III, §2, cl. I; text at notes 228-35 infra. 
78. 
I take it to be a clear point, that we are to be guided, in our decision, by the laws 
and constitution of South Carolina, so far as they can guide us; and where the laws 
do not expressly guide us, we must be guided by principles of a general nature, :;o 
far as they are applicable to the present case. 
I Annals 404. 
79. 'If the laws of that State recognised him as [a citizen], the question was determined, 
because this House could not dispute a fact of that kind.' Ibid. at 403. 
80. See text supra at notes 66-69 supra. 
8 I. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, §34, I Stats. 92. 
82. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, §2, I Stats. 94. 
83. 
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but this 
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and ·not in freedom 
from censure for criminal matter when published. 
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straint. 84 Prosecutions for abuse of the freedom would thus have been 
acceptable under original intent. He has only altered his opinion marginally 
since then. 85 Both David Anderson86 and William Mayton, 87 in different 
ways, have argued for a broader definition of the original intent that 
encompasses also the prohibition of subsequent punishment. Anderson's 
and Mayton's conclusions are nearer the truth in that federalism concerns 
made such prosecutions very worrisome.88 
Two incidents in the First Congress demonstrate congressional opposition 
to seditious libel prosecutions; they are indicative of the congressional 
stance on a federal common law of crime. The first incident was Congress-
man Jackson's opposition to a federal bill of rights. As a Georgian, he was 
concerned with federal assistance against the Indians. 89 He favored a strong 
federal government. Jackson spoke immediately after Madison submitted 
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols. (Oxford, 1765-69) 
iv, 151. 
84. Leonard Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early 
American History (Cambridge, Mass., 1960) 247-48. 
85. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 272-76, 281. In his 
revision, Levy altered his analysis of the Senate's revisions to the extent that he thinks 
now that the Senate did not want to limit the meaning of freedom of the press to its 
common law meaning. Ibid. at 262; Leonard Levy, 'On the Origins of the Free Press 
Clause', supra note 6 at 203n. Levy argues nevertheless that the meaning of 'freedom 
of the press' is Blackstonian, and that only the phrase 'Congress shall make no law' 
gives the first amendment a wider meaning. That wider meaning, however, is only a 
restriction against Congress; the judiciary would be free to operate under the common 
law of crime to prosecute seditious libellers. Levy, of course, would prefer that the 
judiciary leave that past behind. See David M. Rabban, 'The Ahistorical Historian: 
Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History,' 37 Stanford Law 
Review 795 (1985). 
86. David Anderson, 'The Origins of the Press Clause', supra note 25. Anderson's thesis 
leads to the conclusion that the press is by original intent a fourth branch of the 
governmental structure, such that it can have appendant rights. The validity of his 
argument depends on an identity of meaning between state and federal provisions for 
freedom of the press. 
87. William T. Mayton, 'Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of 
Expression', 84 Columbia Law Review 91. Mayton's thesis is that the first amendment 
was superfluous and damaging, since the Treason clause was adequate for the purpose 
of protecting expression. His argument rests on the dubious proposition that the 
protection against seditious libel, a misdemeanor, can be derived from the Treason 
clause, which concerns a felony. Levy has attacked that article, justifiably, but without 
recognizing the substantial contribution it made. Leonard Levy, 'The Legacy Reex-
amined', 37 Stanford Law Review 767 (1985). 
88. See Robert C. Palmer, 'Liberties,' supra note I. 
89. Merill Jensen, ed., The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, 14 
vol. (Madison, 1978) iii, 287-89. Georgia's cooperation with the federal government 
did not last much longer than the first session of the First Congress. Ibid. at 285-90. 
282 Law and History Review 
his proposed amendments.90 Nevertheless, Levy, Anderson, and Mayton do 
not discuss his speech.9t 
Jackson argued against the proposed amendments. Since liberty of the 
press was not being threatened, he said, it needed no further protection. He 
noted that the press had attacked a congressman recently, but that Congress 
had not prosecuted the paper for the attack, even though the Constitution 
would have permitted it. 92 The constitutional provision he referred to was 
the speech or debate clause,93 which prior to the first amendment would 
have permitted prosecutions for breach of privilege in the nature of seditious 
libel, but only for libels against Congress, not the executive.94 Jackson's 
90. Madison submitted his proposed amendments on 8 June 1789. I Annals 431-44·2. 
Jackson, firm in his opposition to consuming time in making amendments to an as yet 
unproved Constitution, immediately opposed them. Ibid. at 442-44. 
91. Leonard Levy, Legacy of Suppression, supra note 84; Leonard Levy, Emergence of a 
Free Press, supra note 12; Leonard Levy, 'On the Origins of Free Press Clause', supra 
note 12; David Anderson, 'The Origins of the Press Clause', supra note 25 [despitt: a 
passing mention in a footnote, p. 522]; William T. Mayton, 'Seditious Libel and the 
Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression', supra note 25. The lack of discussion is 
even more perplexing in that the speech is also included in the standard collection of 
documents relating to the origins of the Bill of Rights. Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of 
Rights: A Documentary History, 2 vols. (New York, 1971) ii, 1034-36. Konvitz quoted 
a large portion of Jackson's speech, stopping before Jackson's reference to the 
Constitution, but did not analyze it. Milton R. Konvitz, Fundamental Liberties of a 
Free People: Religion, Speech, Press, Assembly (Westport, 1957) 352. Levy, at least, 
seems to assume that there is little left in the legislative history, since he relies heavily 
on the fact that no one in the last twenty-five years has found more than he had. Leonard 
Levy, 'On the Origins of the Free Press Clause,' supra note 12 at 203n. The appropriate 
place for him to have analyzed Jackson's speech omits the speech entirely. Leonard 
Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 258-60. 
92. 
The gentleman endeavors to secure the liberty of the press; pray how is this in 
danger? There is no power given to Congress to regulate this subject as they can 
commerce, or peace, or war. Has any transaction taken place to make us suppose 
such an amendment necessary? An honorable gentleman, a member of this House, 
has been attacked in the public newspapers on account of sentiments delivered on 
this floor. Have Congress taken any notice of it? Have they ordered the writer 
before them, even for a breach of privilege, although the Constitution provides that 
a member shall not be questioned in any place for any speech or debate in the 
House? No, these things are offered to the public view, and held up to the 
inspection of the world .... Where, then, is the necessity of taking measures to 
secure what neither is nor can be in danger? 
I Annals 442-43. 
The regulation Jackson mentioned as outside congressional power would have been 
legislative action; congressional enforcement of the speech and debate clause would 
have been by breach of privilege prosecutions. 
93. U.S. Const. Art. I §6, cl. I. ' ... and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they 
shall not be questioned in any other Place.' 
94. In state constitutions somewhat similar language appears that is compatible with 
Jackson's construction of U.S. Const. Art I, §6, cl. I. The Massachusetts Consritution 
of 1780, Art. 21 provided in its Declaration of Rights that: 
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argument supposed that liberty of the press required more than the absence 
of prior restraint: that subsequent punishment would likewise infringe the 
liberty of the press. Liberty of the press was clearly one of the major 
demands for amendment made during the ratification debates. 95 Jackson's 
unchallenged statements about liberty of the press are one indication of a 
broad understanding of freedom of the press in the First Congress. 
A second incident similarly indicates a broad understanding of freedom of 
the press and a presumption against a common law of crime. Toward the end 
of the first session of the First Congress, Congressman Burke attempted to 
censure the press. He alleged that those who had been allowed to sit 'at the 
very foot of the Speaker's chair' to record the debate in the House had 
misrepresented, distorted, and partially suppressed whole arguments, thus 
reflecting 'upon the House a ridicule and absurdity highly injurious to its 
privileges and dignity' .96 The resolution further noted that such reporting 
infringed freedom of debate, referring to the speech or debate clause.97 He 
brought his resolution forward after the House had finished with the Bill of 
Rights, but before the states had ratified it. 98 In the succeeding short debate 
The freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate, in either house of the legislature, 
is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any 
accusation or prosecution, action or complaint, in any other court or place 
whatsoever. 
William Swindler, ed., Sources and Documents of United States Constitutions, 10 vols. 
(Dobbs Ferry, 1973-79) v, 95. The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, Art. 30 is 
almost identical to that of Massachusetts, except that it omitted the word 'accusation'. 
Ibid. at ix, 347. Vermont, not confederated yet with the other states, adopted the 
Massachusetts provision verbatim, modifying the language only to accommodate its 
unicameral legislature. The provision appears in the 1786 Vermont Constitution, ch. I, 
Art. 16. Ibid. at ix, 499. The Georgia Constitution of 1789, Art. I, §14 provided 
somewhat different language: 'Nor shall any member be liable to answer for anything 
spoken in debate in either house, in any court or place whatsoever.' Ibid. at ii, 453. 
Georgia, it should be remembered, was Jackson's home state. No other state had an 
independent speech and debate clause; the Pennsylvania provision of 1790 Art. I, § 17 
('questioned in any other place') was probably borrowed from the federal constitution. 
It seems at least arguable that inclusion of the word 'accusation' and the specification 
of 'any other place' in addition to courts would legitimate breach of privilege 
prosecutions. In states, the rationale would be clear. The primary liberty was a 
republican form of government, for which the representatives had to be free to express 
themselves. That same consideration explains why the provision appeared in declara-
tions of rights, instead of in the structural sections of state constitutions. For a complete 
discussion of these problems, see Robert C. Palmer, 'Liberties', supra note I. 
95. David Anderson, 'The Origins of the Press Clause', supra note 25 at 467-75. 
96. I Annals 917. 
97. Ibid.; U.S. Const. Art. I, §6, cl. I. 
98. The House completed work on the Bill of Rights on September 24, two days before the 
question of the reporting came up. I Annals 913-14. The Senate did not complete 
consideration of the amendments until September 25. Ibid. at 87-88. The amendments 
were not sent to the states until October 2, 1789. Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, 
supra note 91 at ii, 1171. 
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the two remedies suggested were that the reporters be removed from their 
position at the Speaker's chair into the gallery, thus to parallel the British 
system,99 or the passage of a motion that debate be reported accurately and 
impartially. 100 The remedies for the grievance were obviously mild, but 
were still not acceptable. Congressman Hartley objected to Burke's resolu-
tion as an attack on the liberty of the press. 101 Lee, Madison, and White 
spoke against any motion that would approve the reporting of the debates, 
because the reports would then seem to be official publications and the 
reporters perhaps subject to congressional action .102 They preferred that the 
reporters continue to function with the tacit consent of Congre~:s. 103 
Everyone expressed approval for the dissemination of information; and in 
short order the debate terminated with the withdrawal of all motions. 104 
The issue resurfaced the following session. The reporters had mt!ekly 
responded to the criticism levelled at them previously by sitting in the 
gallery. 105 Congressman Page raised the issue, wanting to reassure: the 
reporters that they were welcome and noted the possible repercussions if the 
House seemed to censure the reporters .106 Other congressmen supported the 
reporters, although not wanting to give official sanction to the reporting. No 
one opposed the reporters resuming their position near the Speaker's 
chair. 107 Despite the hurt feelings aroused by misrepresentations, the 
opinion in Congress was that liberty of the press, shaped by federal 
concerns, dictated freedom both from prior restraint and from subsequent 
punishment. Even non-penal restraints seemed excessive. 
The First Congress could hardly have meant to give the federal courts 
jurisdiction over the common law of crime. Congressman Baldwin asserted 
explicitly that the federal government had not adopted the common law. 108 
Legislation consistently referred the courts to state statutory and common 
law, as rules of decision. 109 Moreover, Congress was even sensitive about 
breach of privilege powers granted by Article I, §6, cl. 1. The omission of 
99. I Annals, 918. 
100. Ibid. at919. 
101. 'Congressman Hartley wished a decision on the motion. He contemplated the question 
as involving in it an attack upon the liberty of the press.' Ibid. 
102. Ibid. at 919-20. 
103. Ibid. 
104. Ibid. at 920. 
105. Ibid. at 1059. 
106. Ibid. 
107. Ibid. at I 059-61. 
I 08. I Annals I 071 . For Madison's similar view, see his 1787 letter to George Washington 
reprinted in Joseph H. Smith, Cases and Materials on the Development of Legal 
Institutions, (St. Paul, 1965) 520. 
109. See text at notes 81-82 supra. 
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the limiting clause in §9 and § 11 of the Judiciary Act cannot indicate 
congressional intent to delegate to the courts criminal common law as well 
as the law of nations. The First Congress did not assume that there was a 
federal common law of crime. 
III. Federal Practice Before Wiscart 
The early federal judiciary, like Congress, did not espouse a federal 
common law of crime. Stephen Presser has often maintained that they 
did.IIO Morton Horwitz presumes that the justices exercised federal common 
law jurisdiction in criminal matters. 111 Leonard Levy thought that that was 
the early understanding 112 even before he began to cite Presser as an 
authority. 113 Stewart Jay only recently has similarly maintained that federal 
justices presumed a federal common law of crime. 114 Early federal cases 
nevertheless demonstrate a decent regard for original intent. The federal 
courts willingly applied the law of nations powers delegated to them, 115 but 
showed little inclination to expand that grant of power into a complete 
acceptance of the common law of crime. Offenses committed against the 
law of nations presented no special problems. Congress had given the 
federal courts jurisdiction over offenses against the law of nations without 
prior definition. 116 Even if the justices were unfamiliar with the legislative 
history of the Judiciary Act, they could conclude as much from the act itself. 
And those matters mentioned in Article 1, §8 undoubtedly fell under the 
110. Stephen B. Presser, Studies in the History of the United States Courts of the Third 
Circuit (Washington, 1982) 26-37; 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 26-109; 
Stephen B. Presser and Jamil S. Zainaldin, eds., Law and American History: Cases and 
Materials (St. Paul, 1980) 188-207; Stephen B. Presser and Becky Bair Hurley, 
'Saving God's Republic: The Jurisprudence of Samuel Chase', 1984 University of 
Illinois Law Review 771, 796-97. 
Ill. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, supra note 12 
at 9-15. 
112. Leonard Levy, Legacy of Suppression, supra note 84, 236-41. The origins of Levy's 
advocacy of this view might be found in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in a 
case concerning mere advocacy of sedition. Frankfurter explained the first amendment 
by reference to early state prosecutions for seditious libel and state formulations of the 
speech and press rights. Dennis v. United States 341 U.S. 494, 519-23 (1950). Justice 
Brennan in 1957 reiterated the Frankfurter view of the original intent behind the first 
amendment in the context of an obscenity case. Roth v. United States; Albert v. State 
of California, 354 U.S. 476, 482-84. Levy received encouragement from Frankfurter 
in the course of his investigations. Leonard Levy, Legacy of Suppression, supra note 84 
at xiii. 
113. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 275n. 
114. Stewart Jay, 'Origins of Federal Common Law', supra note 12. 
115. See text at notes 54-61 supra. 
116. Ibid. 
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cognizance of the authority of the United States. Both piracy and offenses 
against the law of nations were thus cognizable. 
The problem concerns the nature of the federal government. Had the 
federal and state governments been alike, the federal government would 
have been a government of inherent authority, capable of acting as required 
and of receiving or having by nature the common law. The acceptance of 
such a federal government would lead readily to the importation of an 
extensive list of crimes developed in a much more aristocratic society, 
including seditious libel. That result would be a departure from the 
assumptions on which the federal Constitution was built117 and a violation of 
the rule established explicitly in the tenth amendment. 118 On the other hand, 
recognition of the federal government as a government of delegated powers 
allows exercise of all delegated powers to their fullest extent without 
contravention of original intent. The traditional line of cases cited in favor 
of the former position actually shows the latter. 
A. Jay's Charge to the Grand Jury: 1790 
The earliest indication that federal courts would apply the law of nations 
without specific congressional definition-no indication of a general federal 
common law-involved Chief Justice Jay in 1790. Jay charged the grand 
jury for the Eastern Circuit to present offenses against the United States. 119 
He wanted the grand jurors to consider the law of nations, federal statutes 
concerning revenue, and misconduct by federal officers. His remarks have 
been exaggerated to reveal a belief in a general federal common law .1 20 
Jay first spoke on the law of nations. He spoke broadly to instruct the 
jurors. 121 
117. William T. Mayton, 'Seditious Libel', supra note 25 at 117-19. Mayton assert~: here 
that 'an understanding was reached at the convention and during the ratification process 
that the national government had no power over speech'. Ibid. at 118. The unden;tand-
ing reached was that the federal government ought to have no power over speech, but 
that as the Constitution stood it might have. Had everyone been content that the 
Constitution actually allowed no power over speech or press, the amendment would not 
have been necessary. Mayton does not treat the Article I, §6, cl. I problem. See text 
at notes 92-93 supra. 
118. U.S. Const. Amend. X. 
119. Henry P. Johnston, ed., The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, 4 vols. 
(New York, 1971) iii, 387-95. 
120. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 48-51. This analysis is excerpted in 
Presser and Zainaldin, Law and American History, supra note 110 at 188-91. 
121. Henry P. Johnston, Public Papers, supra note 119, at iii, 393. Presser's excerpt in his 
article omits the first sentence here, which mentions precisely the laws of the United 
States. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 48. That omission 
might affect the, analysis. Omitting the passage would be reasonable if 'laws of the 
United States' were taken to include statutory and common law. If one takes that phrase 
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The objects of your inquiry are all offences committed against the Jaws of the United 
States in this district, or on the high seas, by persons now in the district. You will 
recollect that the Jaws of nations make part of the Jaws of this, and of every other 
civilized nation. They consist of those rules for regulating the conduct of nations 
towards each other, which, resulting from right reason, receive their obligation from that 
principle and from general assent and practice. 
Presser concluded that thus 'the jurors were to use their own common sense 
and their knowledge of world and national history ... to search for criminal 
acts' .122 Stewart Jay noted that Jay's comments on the law of nations were 
the assertions that would later constitute 'the centerpiece of nonstatutory 
prosecutions' .123 Both Presser and Stewart Jay thus consider that Jay gave 
the jury an unbounded, discretionary authority for indictment. 
Jay's charge was much more reasonable. The law of nations was not 
strictly codified. Blackstone, however, had maintained that it consisted of 
three subjects: violations of safe-conducts, infringement on the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy .124 The inclusion of piracy as part of the law of 
nations was particularly important for Jay's charge, because two of the 
people to be indicted were arrested on suspicion of piracy. 125 Moreover, the 
law of nations had been the subject of sophisticated treatises already, 
including the treatises of VatteP 26 and Puffendorf, 127 both of which were 
cited by contemporary American lawyers. 128 Jay's charge hardly released 
the grand jury into the vast realms of world and national history and 
common sense. 
The alleged pirates were convicted, but there is no report of the argument. 
Jay did proceed in the case, even though the Act for the Punishment of 
certain Crimes against the United States, being considered at the time, had 
not yet passed Congress. 129 That Jay allowed the conviction, however, 
indicates his belief in the court's authority under the law of nations. His 
to include both statutory Jaw and the Constitution, however, a completely different 
conclusion results. 
122. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 48. 
123. Stewart Jay, 'Origins of Federal Common Law', supra note 12 at 1040. He has 
investigated likewise other justices' charges. Wilson and Iredell included citations to 
statutes in their charges, although Wilson accepted law of nations powers. Jay, 
however, presumes that all nonstatutory prosecutions are alike. He does not consider 
the difference that Article III admiralty powers together with Article I §8, cl. 10 law of 
nations authority would make. 
124. William Blackstone, Commentaries, supra note 83 at 68. 
125. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 622-23. 
126. Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nature, applied 
to the conduct and affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (Philadelphia, 1817). This volume 
was a translation of Vattel's posthumous 1773 edition. Ibid. at iii. 
127. Samuel von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations (Oxford, 1703). This was an 
English translation. 
128. United States v. Henfield, II F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) 1117. 
129. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 622. 
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ideas were probably similar to those used later in Henfield, 130 and irrelevant 
for a general federal common law. 
The second area of concern for the grand jury was federal statutes. Jay 
thus charged the jury that: 
The penal statutes of the United States are few and principally respect the revenue. 
The right ordering and management of this important business is very essential to the 
credit, character, and prosperity of our country. On the citizens at large is placed the 
burthen of providing for public exigencies. Whoever therefore fraudulently withdraws 
his shoulder from the common burthen necessarily leaves his portion of the weight to be 
born by the others, and thereby does injustice not only to the government, but to them. 131 
Presser asserts that Jay emphasized the shirking, thus expanding the jury's 
consideration from only the revenue statutes to any offense resulting from an 
individual shirking his duties. 132 Jay's comments are again unobjectionable. 
He referred to the revenue statutes and then exhorted the jury to indict for 
their contravention. A jury might have needed some exhortation to indict a 
fellow state citizen for a federal offense: reminding them of the additional 
burden such offenses put on everyone else was an appropriate exhortation. 
Moreover, this interpretation of Jay's charge in 1790 corresponds nicely to 
Jay's charge written in 1793 for the grand jury in Richmond, Virginia. 133 
There he stated that 'The Constitution, the statutes of Congress, the laws of 
nations, and treaties constitutionally made compose the laws of the United 
States' .134 He then mentioned the revenue statutes and went on to explain 
why infractions of the statutes should be presented, explaining the nece:;sity 
for preserving good public credit. 135 
· In both form and substance, Jay was merely doing his duty. Propliety 
allowed a judge to exhort a grand jury to indict wrongdoers fearlessly, fully, 
and honestly. 136 Moreover, Jay's remarks in substance were no more 
130. See note 62 supra; text at notes 170-93 infra. John Marshall, arguing in Congress in 
1800, maintained not only that piracy, as part of the Jaw of nations, was neces~:arily 
under the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of Article III, but also that the federal 
courts could properly have taken cognizance of such cases absent a statutory mandate. 
10 Annals 614. Marshall perceived the Jaw of nations as having something of an 
independent standing. Ibid. at 607. 
131. Henry P. Johnston, Public Papers, supra note ll9 at iii, 394. 
132. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 49. 
133. Henry P. Johnston, Public Papers, supra note 119 at iii, 478-85. A different charge to 
the same grand jury has survived. 11 F. Cas. 1099, supra note 128 at 1099-105. That 
charge is prefaced to the Henfield case. Goebel believed that the latter charge was the 
one actually delivered to the grand jury. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 
at 623n. The former charge is here used because the charge as actually delivered 
reversed the order of consideration, so that Jay, apologizing for the length of his charge, 
merely mentioned but did not comment on the revenue statutes. 
134. Henry P. Johnston, Public Papers, supra note 119 at iii, 479. 
135. Ibid. at 479-80. 
136. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 620-21. 
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offensive than Madison's remarks in the First Congress: 'A man who 
wounds the honor of his country by a baseness in defrauding the revenue, 
only exposes his neighbors to further and greater impositions.' 137 Neither 
Jay nor Madison need to be construed as exhorting action outside the areas 
in which the courts had statutory definitions. 
The final segment of Jay's charge to the 1790 jury concerned the 
misdeeds of federal officers. The jurors were to 'direct your attention also to 
the conduct of the national officers, and let not any corruptions, frauds, 
extortions or criminal negligences, with which you may find any of them 
justly chargeable, pass unnoticed' .138 Presser asserts that Jay thus allowed 
the jury to indict for 'virtually any examples of wrongdoing against the 
government or the public' .139 Since this part of the charge obviously 
concerned only governmental officials, Presser backed away marginally in 
a later version by bracketing in the comment 'at least as committed by 
government officials' .140 But the charge concerned only governmental 
officials. Even the revised commentary stretched to make a point. Jay's 
charge is no indication of a general federal common law of crime. 141 That 
Presser was unable to find any contemporary criticism of Jay's charge is 
hardly surprising. 142 
Jay had not referred to statutory authority for prosecutions of official 
misconduct. 143 Presser finds in that an indication of a belief in common law 
authority. But a justice, in the opening exhortation to the grand jury, need 
not recite statutes: that would be the prosecutor's job. 144 Had there been no 
statutes under which to prosecute governmental officials, a justice's encour-
agement to prosecute would be a problem. But some statutes did provide 
penalties for official misconduct. 145 In regard to the law of nations, of 
137. I Annals 199. 
138. Henry P. Johnston, Public Papers, supra note 119 at iii, 394. 
139. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 49. 
140. Stephen B. Presser and Jamil S. Zainaldin, Law and American History, supra note 
110 at 189. 
141. Presser goes rather beyond Goebel in evaluating Jay's charge. Goebel merely noted that 
Jay did not advance any specific argument for law of nations offences. Julius Goebel, 
Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 622-23. 
142. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 48n. 
143. Ibid. at 49. 
144. But see Stewart Jay's examination of the practice of other justices. See text at notes 
204-15 infra. 
145. The 'Act to regulate the Collection of the Duties imposed by law on the tonnage of 
ships or vessels, and on goods, wares and merchandises imported into the United 
States' provided for collectors, naval officers, and surveyors. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 
5, 1 Stats. 29. An oath was prescribed, with a forfeiture of $200 for 'failure herein', 
the failure being either the failure to take the oath or the failure to perform duties 
faithfully. Ibid. at §8. The collectors were required to enter into a substantial bond, 
ranging fro'!! $50,000 to $1,000. Any breach of the conditions entailed forfeiture. Ibid. 
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course, Jay would not have been worried about the lack of a statute. 146 J[n his 
charge, it is possible to argue that Jay only performed his proper functions. 
If it seems that the charge as to officials was somewhat broader than the 
statutory base, belief in a federal common law of crime is not the necessary 
deduction. The justices were cognizant of popular concern about federal 
tyranny. A sermon decrying federal official corruption would serve a 
political purpose, even if it resulted in indictments that failed for la·::k of 
legal authority. However that portion of Jay's charge is to be characterized, 
it does not coincide with the conclusions of Presser and Stewart Jay. Jay's 
charge to the grand jury in 1790 is irrelevant to the proposition that early 
federal justices believed in a federal common law of crimes, except 
concerning the law of nations. 147 
B. Benfield's Trial 
In May 1793 Gideon Henfield, an American citizen, acting as prize master 
on a French ship took possession of a British ship captured on the high seas. 
He brought the British ship as a prize to Philadelphia. 148 At the time B:ritain 
and France were at war. The United States was determined to stay neutral, 
at §28. Criminal conviction may have been proof of breach, but may have entailed no 
further punishment. The various officers were likewise required to set up openly a table 
of fees and duties, failure to do which resulted in a forfeiture of $100. Ibid. at §29. A 
demand for excessive fees or other rewards resulted in a forfeiture of $200, although 
solely to the use of the party aggrieved. Ibid. at §29. Query if such a failure would 
result in forfeiture of the bond. Such officers who received a bribe or connived at .1 false 
entry forfeited not less than $200 nor more than $2000 for each offence and entailed 
disablement from office. Ibid. at §35. See also William Blackstone, Commentaries, 
supra note 83 at iv, 303-07. The 'Act for Registering and Clearing Vessels, Regulating 
the Coasting Trade, and for other purposes' provided similar penalties, but without an 
informer provision, for making false registry, taking excessive fees, rendering false 
descriptions of vessels, or mere neglect of duty. Act of Sept. I, 1789, ch. II, !i34, I 
Stats. 55, 64-65. The act that established the Treasury Department prohibited treasury 
officers from self-interested or conflicting obligations, contravention of which was a 
high misdemeanor punishable by fine, removal from office, and disablement of office, 
with informers, if any, receiving half the forfeiture. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, §8, 
I Stats. 65, 67. 
146. See text at notes 129-30 supra. 
14 7. A constitutional construction that allowed prosecution under the law of nations without 
a statutory base proves nothing about ordinary common law crimes. The doctrine that 
dictated that jurisdiction could not be exercised without a statute further defining the 
crime and the penalty began later. See text at notes 276-80 infra. The result of thPJ later 
conclusion was the possibility of a grant of jurisdiction that could not be exercised: not 
necessarily a desirable situation. 
148. Henfield, II F. Cas. at 1116. Leonard Levy's discussion of Henfield is supe1ficial. 
Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, su.pra note 12 at 276. Stewart Jay's 
discussion of Henfield is mostly contextual, as if the surrounding politics provided the 
meaning of the case. Stewart Jay, 'Origins of the Federal Common Law', supra note 
12 at 1042-53. His discussion adds nothing to Presser's treatment. 
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despite strong domestic feelings in favor of France because of the perceived 
similarity at that time between the American Revolution and the French 
Revolution. 149 Henfield was indicted in federal court for offenses against the 
law of nations and under United States treaties. Henfield is the earliest case 
normally cited as proof of the early judiciary's belief in a federal common 
law of crime. 150 
Henfield was a criminal prosecution at common law, although not at 
federal common law. Justice Wilson, in his charge to the grand jury, talked 
about the common law, 'as now received in America' .151 Since the common 
law associated other laws to it, the common law incorporated the law of 
nations. The law of nations regulated the relations of nations, and thus 
indispensably to a certain degree the conduct of a nation's citizens. A citizen 
who took it upon himself to wage war was in violation of the law of nations 
and thus in violation of the common law .152 Wilson did not talk about 
'United States common law' as distinct from state common law: his 
language, from our perspective, was vague, as if referring to a single system 
of law. He was confident that no statute was necessary to prosecute 
Henfield. 
Henfield's prosecutors were Attorney General Randolph and District 
149. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20, 624-25. 
150. Ibid. at 623; Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 276. Leonard 
Levy's earlier citation of a counterfeiting case rested on a misdated case, the date of 
which was revised only later by Goebel. Leonard Levy, Legacy of Suppression, supra 
note 84 at 239-40; text at note 282 infra. Presser, of course, finds a substantial problem 
with Jay's 1790 charge to the grand jury. See text at notes 119-47 infra. 
151. II F. Cas. at I 106. The statement is not equivalent to an assertion that the federal 
government has received the common law. 
152. Ibid. at 1107-108. Wilson was unlikely to derive a jurisdiction directly from the 
common law. In December 1787, at the convention in Pennsylvania to ratify the federal 
constitution, Wilson got into an argument about federal prosecution of libels, the focal 
point for jurisdiction in strictly criminal common law areas. The argument there 
centered on what would happen if Congress made a statute to prosecute libels; Wilson 
first argued that Congress had no such power. Then, to answer the question directly, he 
maintained that, 'even if it had the power to make laws on this subject', the accused was 
no worse off than under the state government. Merril Jensen, ed., Documentary 
History, supra note 89 at ii, 454-55. That argument would be perplexing if they were 
arguing about a disputed power in Congress to do what everyone thought the federal 
courts could do anyway. The natural conclusion is that both Wilson and the 
anti-federalists were here assuming that the courts had no jurisdiction derived strictly 
from common law, but might receive specific powers from congressional legislation. 
See David Anderson, 'Origins of the Press Clause', supra note 25 at 504; William T. 
Mayton, 'Seditiou~ Libel', supra note 25 at 180n. Leonard Levy, rejecting the analysis 
of both Anderson and Mayton indicating that Wilson was speaking hypothetically, 
simply cannot have re-read the whole passage. Levy first says that Wilson assumed the 
existence of federal court power to prosecute seditious libel, then, in the same 
paragraph, talks about his assertion of the same proposition. Leonard Levy, Emergence 
of a Free Press, supra note 25 at 240-41. Wilson's argument neither assumed nor 
asserted that proposition, except in relation to state governments. 
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Attorney William Rawle. 153 Randolph thought the common law was 
involved. In his official capacity he advised the Secretary of State that 
Henfield could be prosecuted. Henfield had violated United States treaties 
that were legally binding on citizens; but he was also indictable at common 
law, because his actions disrupted the peace of the United States. 154 Like 
Jay, Randolph was not specific about whose common law would be used. 
Randolph had examined the common law in 1790, reporting to Congress 
on the Judiciary Act. He believed then that the United States had adopted the 
common law to the extent of using it to explain terminology in state and 
federal statutes and to handle cases that arose within a particular state. 155 He 
considered any further relationship to the common law unsure and thought 
that the ambiguity should be resolved by adopting the common law a!; the 
rule of decisions insofar as it was not discordant with the Constitution, 
federal statutes, or the laws of the several states. 156 Even in his suggested 
scheme, however, state law would be the rule of decisions on the merits, in 
matters of evidence, or limitations of time occasionally even in criminal 
matters. 157 If he had not changed his perspective on the subject, Benfield 
could have been an instance in which state law would be the rule of 
decisions. 
Randolph had written an opinion in 1792 that stated both that the United 
States had not, by constitution or municipal act, adopted the law of nations 
and that nonetheless the law of nations was part of the law of the land. 158 
Perhaps Randolph thought that that was the consequence of the Judic:iary 
Act. Or perhaps he thought the federal government was completely 
possessed of common law authority, both as a source of jurisdiction and as 
a means of executing that jurisdiction, although the sources thus far cited do 
not quite establish that as his position. Whatever his opinion, however,. the 
indictments Randolph and Rawle produced in Benfield were rather mild. 159 
153. Ibid. at 1116. 
154. William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United 
States, 3 vols. (Chicago, 1953) i, 629-30. 
155. Report of the Attorney General Read in the House of Representatives Dec. 31, 1790 
(1791) 10. 
156. Ibid. at 10, 28. 
157. Ibid. at 33. William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the American Constitution, !:upra 
note 154 at i, 626-30. Goebel's remarks on Randolph seem rather better than 
Crosskey's, particularly in reference to the way in which the report was relegated 
without action by the Congress. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 541-42. 
Congress apparently considered the ambiguity Randolph found a proper and unambig·· 
uous omission. 
158. Official Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States, 30 vols. (Washington, 
1852-1919) i, 27 [hereinafter: Off Opinions A.G.]. 
159. Whether Randolph or Rawle had the greater responsibility for the indictments is 
unclear. There has survived in print a draft indictment written by Randolph with 
marginal notations apparently by Hamilton. 11 F. Cas. 1115-16n. Nevertheless, the 
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All twelve counts cited treaties; only six referred to the law of nations; none 
were based directly on common law. 160 
William Rawle was similarly circumspect. He followed Wilson's general 
argument, agreeing that the law of nations was part of the law of the land 
and that an individual waging war was in violation of the law of nations and 
thus indictable. 161 He once mentioned English 'national common law' .162 
His point then, however, was in regard to the law of nations. He did not 
maintain that the federal government had adopted English common law. 
Both Randolph and Rawle worked in this case on a relatively restricted 
argument, regardless of the powers that they might otherwise have felt 
inhered in the federal government. 
Du Ponceau, Ingersoll, and Sergeant argued for the defence. 163 They 
made two arguments relevant here, preserved only in outline. The first was 
that 'the indictment did not include an offence at common law' .164 Their 
concern with the common law probably derived from the shared assumption 
that the law of nations was part of the common law. That the law of nations, 
not the common law as such, was central, appears from the prosecution's 
care to refute a law of nations argument on the right of a freeman to enlist 
in a foreign government's military service. 165 Moreover, the defense 
certainly argued the law of nations. 166 The second relevant argument made 
report makes it seem that Rawle carried the argument: 'Mr. Rawle, district attorney, 
with whom was Mr. Randolph, attorney general.' II F. Cas. 1116. Rawle's influence 
appeared also in the application of Pennsylvania law. See text at notes 146-60 infra. 
The importance of Pennsylvania law might indicate that Rawle had a hand in the 
indictments also. 
160. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 625. Goebel mentions that the common 
law disturbance of the peace of the United States allegation only appeared in the 
inclusion of the words 'against the peace and dignity of the United States' and that those 
words were treated as mere surplusage. Ibid. The reason for the inclusion of those 
words, however, is even less indicative than he thought of an idea of a general federal 
common law. See text at notes 172-73 infra. 
161. 
The law of nations is part of the law of the land. 4 Bl. Comm. 66; [Res publica v. 
De Longchamps] 1 Dall. [1 U.S.] 111; C. L. lib. This is an offence against the 
laws of nations. It is punishable by indictment on information as such. [Respublica 
v. De Longchamps] 1 Dall. [I U.S.] 114, &c.; 3 Burrows, 1480. 
11 F. Cas. at 1117. 
162. Ibid. ('Nor are these only the speculations of the closet. We see them carried into effect 
in England in affirmation of national common Jaw, i.e. the Jaw of nations.') 
163. 1bid. at 1119. Du Ponceau decades later made some comments on the case. See text at 
note 196 infra. 
164. 11 F. Cas. at 1119. 
165. Ibid. at 1118. 
166. Ibid. at 1119 ('On the question under the laws of nations were cited, 6 Hume, Hist. 
Eng. 433; 1 Hutch. Hist. Mass. Bay, 251; 3 Vatt. LawNat. 15; Bynk[ershoek] 22d, c.; 
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for Henfield was that since 'there was no statute giving jurisdiction, the 
court could take no cognizance of the offence' . 167 That argument should 
have, but did not elicit a response referring to the Judiciary Act, § 11.168 The 
closest counterpart to this. was the prosecution's careful response to an 
alleged lack of precedent. 169 Whatever the detailed arguments for Hen field 
were, no one seems to have raised the problem of exercising a constitution-
ally permissible jurisdiction without statutory definition of the crime. 
The prosecution expected to apply Pennsylvania law. The argument in the 
case dealt at length with the incorporation of the law of nations into the 
common law, so that the case was a case at common law. The reason for 
insisting on that nexus between the law of nations and the common law was 
to establish the applicable law. The Judiciary Act §34 specified that at lrials 
at common law the applicable law was the law of the state, unless federal 
law dictated otherwise. 170 By linking the law of nations to the common law, 
the prosecutors brought the suit under the Judiciary Act, thus providing a 
rule of decision. 
Various references indicate that the prosecutors were following Pennsyl-
vania law. At decisive points the prosecution cited Respublica v. De 
Longchamps, 171 a Pennsylvania state court case decided in 1784, well 
before the Constitution. De Longchamps had assaulted Marbois, the Fn!nch 
Consul General, Consul for the state of Pennsylvania, and secretary of the 
French Legation 'in violation of the laws of nations, against the peace and 
dignity of the United States and of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania' . 172 
This state court case, not Randolph's theories, 173 dictated the form of the! 
indictment. McKean, C.J., ruled that the law of nations was part of the law 
of Pennsylvania and that the law for the case would be derived from 
treatises. 174 Moreover, the De Longchamps indictment, regardless of any 
Syn. Gal. Rep. 94.') Du Ponceau later (1810), published a translation of 
Bynkershoek's Treatise on the Law of War. 
167. II F. Cas. at 1119. The other arguments recorded related to the presidential 
proclamation of neutrality and to the proper inferences that could be derived from the 
construction of treaties, neither of which is relevant to the federal common law of 
crimes. 
168. See text at notes 39-48 supra. 
169. II F. Cas. 1117. 
170. Act of September 24, 1789, §34. A federal judge explicitly adopted this constru·~tion 
of the provision in 1807, the same year in which Marshall ruled to the contrary .. 
Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 345. 
171. See note 161 supra. 
172. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111. 
173. See text at notes 155-60 supra. 
174. I U.S. at 114 ('It must be determined on the principles of the laws of nations, which 
form a part of the municipal law of Pennsylvania'), and 116 ('The first crime in the 
indictment is an infraction of the law of nations. This law, in its full extent, is part of 
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seeming absurdity, 175 provided the authority for the use in federal court of 
state law to punish an offense against the United States. In 1799 Randolph 
maintained that he had probably been doing exactly that in Henfield. 176 The 
citation of De Longchamps is thus good evidence that the prosecutors 
indicted under the law of nations through common law in order to apply 
Pennsylvania state law under the Judiciary Act, §34. 
A parallel use of Pennsylvania law confirms the legal theory of Henfield' s 
indictment. Henfield argued that he was a French citizen; he had made that 
claim a month after his incarceration in Philadelphia. 177 The argument was 
based on the right to emigrate, a right 'natural to freemen' .178 The 
prosecution did not deny the right, but only sought to show that it did not 
apply when the accused had still claimed U.S. citizenship at his arrest. 179 In · 
argument, the defense asserted that: 'The bill of rights declares, emigration 
shall not be prohibited. '180 The federal Bill of Rightsl81 says nothing about 
emigration. The Pennsylvania Constitution, however, did. The first Consti-
the law of this state, and is to be collected from the practice of different nations, and 
the authority of writers.') 
175. William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution, supra note 154 at i, 63ln. 
Crosskey worried that in the case of an offence strictly against the United States there 
would be no applicable state law. 
176. In 1799 Randolph explained to Madison what, at that distance, he thought he must have 
been doing in Henfield. 
5. This must have been the idea, if I meant to say that he was triable at common 
law in the federal court; that the treaties, by stipulating for peace with the U.S., 
in substance prohibited the citizens of the U. S. from engaging in a war against the 
nations with whom the treaties subsisted: that treaties being the supreme law, and 
the judicial act having provided that the laws of the States should be the rule of 
decision, that they should apply: the laws of Pennsylvania, within whose 
boundaries the offence was committed, comprehending the common law, would 
aid the treaty, which had specified no penalty for Henfield's crime, by one of its 
general principles, namely, that when a statute forbids a thing to be done, without 
annexing a penalty, the common law makes it indictable and punishable, as a 
misdemeanor. This, I believe, was the doctrine which I urged at the trial. 
6. This opinion does not bring up the common law as the law of the U.S .... 
common law, as the law of the U.S., would create offences. 
Moncure Daniel Conway, Omitted Chapters of History Disclosed in the Life and Papers 
of Edmund Randolph (New York, 1888) 185. 
Crosskey belittled Randolph's recollection and asserted that there was no record of 
any such argument at the Henfield trial, without bothering to look into the sources cited 
in the case. William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution, supra note 154 
at i, 630-31. 
177. 11 F. Cas. at 1116. 
178. Ibid. at 1118. 
179. Ibid. at 1116. 
180. Ibid. at 1118. 
181. U.S. Const. Amend. 1-X. 
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tution of Pennsylvania referred to emigration as a 'natural inherent right', 182 
perhaps the source of part of the language in the case. 183 The Constitution 
of Pennsylvania of 1790, Art. IX, §25, provided 'that emigration from the 
State shall not be prohibited' .184 Although the lawyers disagreed about 
applicability, both sides considered the provision binding: Pennsylvania 
state law applied in this prosecution for a strictly federal offense. 
Justice Wilson would favor such arguments. He had assisted the Penn-
sylvania attorney general in De Longchamps. 185 He thus knew that Penn-
sylvania had accepted the law of nations into its state law. Moreover, as a 
Pennsylvanian himself and the chief architect of the 1790 Pennsylvania 
constitution, he would be amenable to applying Pennsylvania law .186 The 
citation of the leading Pennsylvania case, the acceptance of Pennsylvania 
constitutional provisions as binding, and the familiarity of Justice W:ilson 
with Pennsylvania law make it clear that the court was applying the law of 
Pennsylvania as the rule of decision. 
The Judiciary Act §34 dictated that result. 187 Although Marshall in dicta 
later indicated a preference to apply §34 only to civil cases, 188 his reading 
182. William Swindler, Sources and Documents, supra note 94 at viii, 279. 
183. See text at note 178 supra. 
184. William Swinder, Sources and Documents, supra note 94 at viii, 293. The use of the 
words 'law of the land' is less significant. The phrase was derived from Magna Carta. 
Magna Carta (1215), ch. 39 (to become ch. 29 in later revisions); Bernard Schwartz, 
The Bill of Rights, supra note 91 at i, 12. That provision was the distant antecedent of 
the fifth amendment provision against the taking of 'life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law'. U.S. Const. Amend. V. The U.S. Constitution, of course, does 
not use the words 'law of the land'. But the corresponding provision in the 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 did. Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1790, Art. IX, 
§9, William Swinder, Sources and Documents, supra note 94 at 292. It is thus 
conceivable that the 'law of the land' language in Henfield likewise demonstrates use 
of Pennsylvania law, although the words were common enough in legal parlan·~e to 
have been drawn from many other sources. 
185. De Longchamps, I U.S. (I Dall.) Ill at 113. 
186. Dictionary of American Biography, II vols. (New York, 1936) x, 329. 
187. 'Sec. 34. And be it further enacted, That the laws of the several states, except where 
the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or 
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the coUJts of 
the United States in cases where they apply. 'Act of Sept. 24, 1789, I Stars. at 92. 
Reference to state criminal law would not be unheard of, since the federal courts i·n the 
District of Columbia applied the criminal law of the states of Maryland and Virginia. 
albeit in an unusual jurisdiction. United States v. Heinegan, 26 F. Cas. 253 (C.C.D.C. 
I802)(No. 15,340). United States v. Winslow, 28 F. Cas. 737 (C.C.D.C. 1812)(No. 
16,741). United States v. Gassaway, 25 F. Cas. 1263 (C.C.D.C. 1844)(No. 15,190). 
188. After quoting the Judiciary Act, §34, Marshall went on to describe its effect: 
It might certainly be well doubted whether this section, (if it should be constru•!d 
to extend to all the proceedings in a case where a reference can be made to the state 
laws for a rule of decision at the trial) can comprehend a case where, at the trial 
in chief, no such reference can be made. Now in criminal cases the laws of the 
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is unwarranted. Both Randolph189 and Du Ponceau 19o came to the opposite 
conclusion. Moreover, §33 and §35 191 relate to criminal matters, so that 
context would not restrict §34 to civil matters. 192 Nothing in the wording of 
§34 would indicate that it did not apply to criminal matters. Other 
constitutional considerations make such an application of §34 to criminal 
matters necessary .193 The rules of decision section of the Judiciary Act 
properly applied both to civil and criminal cases at common law, as was 
done in Henfield. 
United States constitute the sole rule of decision; and no man can be condemned 
or prosecuted in the federal courts on a state law. The laws of the several states 
therefore cannot be regarded as rules of decision in trials for offences against the 
United States. It would seem to me too that the technical term, 'trials at common 
law', used in the section, is not correctly applicable to prosecutions for crimes. I 
have always conceived them to be, in this section, applied to civil suits, as 
contradistinguished from those which come before the court sitting as a court of 
equity or admiralty. 
David Robertson, ed., Reports of the Trials of Colonel Aaron Burr In the Circuit 
Court of the United States, 2 vols., (New York, 1807) ii, 482. Marshall's tentative 
opinion is not indicative of practice. In 1800, a federal court looked into Pennsylvania 
law as to summoning congressmen as witnesses in a libel trial. Justice Peters asserted 
personal knowledge of the Pennsylvania practice, but Justice Chase preferred to follow 
an independent course. United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 626 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800)(No. 
14,861). In the same year, counsel for the accused expressly cited §34 as authority for 
using the English practice of jury authority in criminal authority, since Virginia law had 
adopted English common law; Justice Chase rejected the implications of the argument. 
United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800)(No. 14,709). In United 
States v. Moore, the court inquired into Pennsylvania practice in regard to compulsory 
process for witnesses prior to an indictment, but found that there had been no 
adjudications on the normal practice. 26 F. Cas. 1208 (C.C.D. Pa. 180l)(No. 15,805). 
The prosecution in United States v. Smith asserted that state law governed practices 
relating to tendering expenses with service of a subpoena. 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D. 
N.Y. 1806)(No. 16,342). As late as 1818 counsel alleged in United States v. Hare that 
state law, because of §34, applied to the problems of mail robbers who merely stood 
mute and refused to plead. The court ruled that if the laws of the United States were 
insufficient, Maryland law sufficed as the rule of decision. 26 F. Cas. 149, 150-157 
(C.C.D. Md. 1818)(No. 15,304). Bridwell and Whitten cited Marshall's determination 
here as an early decision, and then went on to show how any inclusion of criminal suits 
at common law for §34 was clearly mistaken. Randall Bridwell and Ralph U. Whitten, 
The Constitution and the Common Law, supra note 12 at 36-37. Johnson dismissed the 
relevance of §34 to criminal law by reference to Marshall's opinion and Commonwealth 
v. Schaffer. George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Hist. S.C., supra note 12 at 
634-35. Schaffer was a case in the mayor's court of Philadelphia in which the argument 
concerning §34 was made but was then rejected by the court. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) xxvi, 
xxviii, xxxi, Appendix. 
189. See note 176 supra. 
190. Peter S. Du Ponceau, A Dissertation on the Nature and Extent of the Courts of the 
United States (Philadelphia, 1824) 36-37. 
191. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, I Stats. 92-93. 
192. PeterS. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra note 190 at 37-38. 
193. See text at notes 216-43 infra. 
298 Law ana I ~istor:; Review 
Peter Du Ponceau made thm: argument in a treatise in 1824, 194 but not in 
regard to Benfield. He explained the difference between the common law as 
a source of jurisdiction and the common law as a means of exercising a 
jurisdiction granted by Constitution or statute. 195 Du Ponceau treated 
Benfield only in a note. 196 He objected to Wilson's emphasis on the 
common law, since the offense was against the law of nations, which stood 
on an independent basis. 197 Du Ponceau did not integrate Benfield into his 
analysis. On the basis of the clause 'where they apply' in the Judiciary Act, 
§34, he maintained that offenses solely against the United States had no 
appropriate state law. 198 Henfield was such a case, so §34 did not apply. He 
did not consider the way in which cases like De Longchamps made state law 
applicable to federal offenses. Du Ponceau, in all this, professed to have 
come to a new understanding of the law only recently. 199 He displayed no 
realization that the emphasis on the common law allowed application of tht! 
rules of decision clause and no recollection that they had used Pennsylvania 
law. Developments in the succeeding years explain his feeling of novelty. 200 
Wilson in Benfield applied Pennsylvania law according to the Judiciary 
Act, §34. Pennsylvania had applicable law from the time prior to the 
Constitution when the states justifiably prosecuted crimes against the 
confederacy. He demonstrated no belief in a general federal common law of 
crime or in a federal government of inherent authority rather than one of 
delegated powers. Since state law was available as the rule of decision, 
Congress only had to grant the jurisdiction and did not have to define the: 
crimes or the penalties. 201 The controversy occasioned by Benfield had 
much more to do with popular feelings in favor of republican France than 
194. Ibid. For other early treatises that cover the cases, see Thomas Serjeant, Constitu .. 
tiona! Law. Being a View of the Practice and Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United 
States and of Constitutional Points Decided (Philadelphia, 1830) 272-74, and William 
Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America, (New York, 2nd 
ed., 1970) 258-73. 
195. PeterS. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra note 190 at xiii, xxviii, 17-20. The argument 
was not novel. Justice Washington seems to have been employing the same distinction 
in United States v. McGill, quoted supra note 62. 
196. PeterS. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra note 190 at 3-4. 
197. Ibid. 
198. Ibid. at 41-42. See text at note 175 supra. 
199. 
I did not, any more than others, escape the general contagion. It was not until after 
repeated discussions of these questions in the law academy, that I began to 
perceive that the words 'common law jurisdiction', had no definite meaning, and 
was led to enter into this investigation of the subject. 
PeterS. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra note 190 at 6n. 
200. See text at notes 253-67 infra. 
201. 
I shall endeavor to prove to you, that it is not true as a general principle, that the 
judiciary whether in criminal or civil cases, have not jurisdiction of the commc•n 
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with the legal analysis. 202 Although the jury acquitted Henfield, Wilson, 
like Jay, .had performed his duty. Henfield, like Jay's 1790 charge, is 
irrelevant to the existence of a federal common law of crime.203 
C. The Views of Iredell and Paterson 
The views of Justices Iredell and Paterson around the time of Henfield 
confirm that the decision does not approve the notion of a federal common 
law of crimes. Stewart Jay has recently isolated James Iredell as a prominent 
exception to what he sees as Justice Jay's advocacy of federal common law 
authority, but an exception that fell by the wayside.204 Iredell did initially read 
the Article I §8, cl. 1 definitional power as necessarily exercised in advance 
of court action.205 Iredell re-evaluated his stand in 1794, in his charges to the 
grand juries of North and South Carolina. 206 This re-evaluation was hardly 
the affirmation, as Stewart Jay assumes, of a federal common law of crime. 
Iredell's views in 1794 mirror the views expressed in H enfield that the 
common law being applied was state, not federal common law. 
law, or cannot take cognisance of common law offences; that, on the contrary, 
whenever jurisdiction is completely vested in them from either of the sources 
above mentioned, they have cognisance of the law, whatever it may be, that is 
necessary to give effect to that jurisdiction, and they are not in all cases to wait 
until Congress have legislated upon the subject. 
Peter S. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra note 190 at 32. 
Bridwell and Whitten discard the distinction between 'jurisdiction of' and 'jurisdic-
tion from' the common law. They note that Story approved of the former, but not the 
latter. They also note, however, that the distinction is useless. 
[f]or the fundamental objection to the exercise of such power is the same in both 
cases. The objection is that criminal law results peculiarly from an exercise of the 
sovereign lawmaking authority, which in our system was originally confided to the 
legislative branch of government. 
Randall Bridwell and Ralph Whitten, The Constitution and the Common Law, supra 
note 12 at 46. Story, of course, was familiar with that conception of criminal law, so 
their casual rejection of the distinction and of Story's authority can be easily questioned. 
They note that common law in civil matters derives from community behavior, a factor 
that makes it distinctly different from criminal law. Ibid. But the law of nations derives, 
in eighteenth century literature, from the community behavior of nations. 
202. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 53-56. 
203. See text at notes 128-30 supra. 
204. Stewart Jay, 'Origins of Federal Common Law', supra note 12 at 1040. 
205. Ibid. Stewart Jay cites Iredell's South Carolina charge of 12 May 1794. Stewart Jay, 
'Origins of Federal Common Law', supra note 12 at 1041. He does not mention the 
North Carolina charge of 2 June 1794, which seems to coincide closely with the South 
Carolina charge of the previous month. 
206. James Iredell, 'Charge delivered to the grand jury for the District of North Carolina in 
the Circuit court of the United States, June 2, 1794', in Joseph H. Smith, Cases and 
Materials, supra note 108, 524-26. 
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Iredell's North Carolina charge was a minor treatise.2°7 The first section 
treats English law; it begins by mentioning English common law and ends 
with a comment on an act of Parliament. Iredell in this section established 
first that English common law recognized the principles of the law of 
nations. Then he noted that no nation ought to legislate contrary to those 
principles, but that such legislation, if passed, would be binding. Finally, he 
argued that common law recognition of the law of nations entailed 
enforcement of law of nations' prohibitions on a country's own citizens. An 
individual's contravention of a law of nations obligation would constitute 'a 
contempt of his duty to the community';208 the courts could proceed against 
him under that theory. The first section concerned only English common 
law, although the hearers would have inferred from the mere mentions of 
'the common law' an application to the United States. 
The second section applied English principles to the North Amelican 
context. English common law had applied in colonial North Carolina. The 
only exceptions were provided by special colonial circumstances or statute. 
The principles of the law of nations fell under neither exception. Thus, at the 
time of the Revolution, the law of nations portion of the English common 
law was accepted in North Carolina: 'this part of the common law subsisted 
in full force in this State previous to the Revolution' .209 The application he 
was making was not to the United States government, but to the state 
government of North Carolina. 
The third section dealt with the consequences of the Revolution. 
Principles of the common law in force in the colonies were abolished only 
when 'absolutely inconsistent' 210 with the change in situation or when 
altered by the people or the legislature. Iredell denied that such changes 
relating to the law of nations had been made. The English common law 
recognition of the law of nations, by its application in the colony, now 
applied within the state of North Carolina. Whereas Herifield had built on a 
specific case, Iredell replicated the H enfield result on the basis of the general 
structure of state common law. 
The fourth section of Iredell's charge considered possible modifications 
of state law by the Articles of Confederation or the Constitution. Under the 
Articles of Confederation state law was not altered, because any law of 
nations prosecution would take place in a 'competent State court, acting 
under the laws of the State and the control of their public duty' .211 Nor did 
the Constitution alter state law. The Constitution only allowed Congress two 
relevant powers: the power to establish federal courts for such cases and the 
power to make any alterations necessary in the law. Iredell then cited the 
207. James Iredell, 'Charge', supra note 206. 
208. Ibid. at 525. 
209. Ibid. 
210. Ibid. 
211. Ibid. at 526. 
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rules of decision section of the Judiciary Act to show that Congress had 
considered the relevant state law in force. 212 The congressional act for 
punishing offenses against the United States only modified that law; where 
United States law was silent, state common law applied. 
Iredell's jurisprudence does not sustain any argument for a federal 
common law of crime. He believed that the federal courts could prosecute 
nonstatutory crimes. But just as nonstatutory prosecutions are not all 
similar, resorts to 'common law' are not all the same. Federal jurisdiction 
derived both from the Constitution and from the Judiciary Act. The law that 
would apply in such cases, as mandated by federal statute, was not federal 
law, but state common law. 
Stewart Jay has located an opinion by Justice Paterson which, contrary to 
Jay's interpretation, is best viewed in the same way as Iredell's charge.213 
Paterson stated that a violator, in Henfield's situation, could be prosecuted. 
He explicitly drew the law of nations then into the common law. 'This is an 
offence. -How? By the law of nations, or, in other words, by the common 
law, which comprehends the law of nations. ' 214 He did not expound on 
whose common law, but the association, made both by Iredell and in 
Henfield, was undoubtedly made to establish state common law as the rule 
of decision. More interestingly for the contrast with post-Wiscart cases, is 
Paterson's specification that such a case arose 'under the constitution, as 
distinct from an offence arising under the law of the United States' .215 The 
case arose under the Constitution because of the grant of admiralty 
jurisdiction in Article III and the congressional power to define offenses in 
Article I §8, cl. 10, with jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act. 
In 1794 Jay, Wilson, Iredell, and Paterson can, therefore, be identified as 
supporting limited constitutional jurisdiction over nonstatutory offenses. 
The sources for that jurisdiction were simply irrelevant to seditious libel 
prosecutions. The common law that they applied was not federal, but state 
common law. The way in which they handled the law of nations but did not 
extend their jurisdiction to seditious libel and other merely common law 
crimes accorded both with the Constitution and the debates and statutes of 
the First Congress. In 1794 the Supreme Court had no doubt that the federal 
government was different from state governments and that the demands of 
federalism, as dictated by statute, mandated reliance on state law. 
D. United States v. Ravara 
Joseph Ravara was a Genoese consul prosecuted in 1793-94 for sending 
threatening letters to extort money from Mr. Hammond, the British 
212. Ibid. 
213. Stewart Jay, 'Origins of Federal Common Law', supra note 12 at 1052, n. 243. 
214. Ibid. 
215. Ibid. See text at notes 282-330 infra. 
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Minister.216 His defense argued that the allegation did not constitute a 
statutory or common law crime, that the law of nations required immunity 
for consuls, and that the evidence was too circumstantiaJ.217 Ravara was 
convicted without reference to statutory authority.21s Since the case did not 
rest on the law of nations, it presents a different issue in the history of the 
supposed federal common law of crimes. 
Rawle's argument was convincing, although only briefly reported. 
Ravara claimed the status of a public minister, although he was only a 
consul. Defense cited only Vattel for the protection due a consul.219 Ra.wle 
denied that consular status implied immunity. His denial can be explained 
by three arguments. Article III specifies federal jurisdiction over cettain 
persons, including 'Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls·· .220 
That wording implies that consuls are not public ministers. The Judiciary 
Act § 13 makes the same distinction: 'jurisdiction of suits brought by 
ambassadors or other public ministers, or in which a consul or vice-consul 
shall be a party' .221 Similarly, the treaties in force at the time of Ravara did 
not give consuls immunity.222 Finally, only Vattel considered consuls public 
ministers; other writers excluded consuls from immunity. 223 Even Vattel 
thought protection only proper, not required. 224 Ravara had no convincing 
claim to immunity. 
A different defense was the alleged lack of a statutory or common law 
basis for the suit. Julius Goebel dismissed the defense's argument about the 
216. United States v. Ravara, 27 F. Cas. 713 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793)(No. 16,122). Leonard 
Levy barely mentions Ravara. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 
12 at 276. 
217. United States v. Ravara, 27 F. Cas. 714 (C.C.D. Pa. 1794)(No. 16,122a). The issue 
in this preliminary stage had to do with whether the original jurisdiction over consuls 
(U.S. Const., Art. III, §2, cl. I) intended an exclusive jurisdiction, such that the grant 
of 'exclusive' jurisdiction to the circuit courts (Judiciary Act, § 11) was void. Although 
the argument properly failed there, the issue as to whether statute could narrow federal 
court jurisdiction came to be vital. See text at notes 255-61 infra. 
218. Ibid. at 715. 
219. Ibid. 
220. U.S. Const. Art. lll, §2, cl. I. 
221. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stats. 80-81. Prior to the trial of Ravara and in an unrelated 
case, William Bradford, Attorney General, gave his opinion based on the constitutional 
language and on the Judiciary Act that a consul is not a public minister and not entitled 
to the immunity due public ministers. Off. Opinions of the A. G., supra note 158 at i, 
42. The worries here about the place of trial conflicting with original criminal 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is obviated by the decision in Ravara. See note 217 
supra. 
222. Commonwealth v. Kosloff, 5 Serg. & Rawle 544, 545-46 (Pennsylvania, 1819). 
Tilghman, C.J. here analyzed Ravara. 
223. Ibid. at 545. 
224. Ibid.; Vattel, Law of Nations, supra note 126 at 147-49 (Bk. 2, ch. 2, §34). 
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lack of a statutory basis as nonsense,225 because section 28 of the Act for the 
Punishment of certain Crimes declared the punishment for offering personal 
violence to a public minister. 226 Nevertheless, Rawle insisted that 'the 
offense was indictable at common law' .227 The indictment could have had a 
statutory basis, even though the prosecution preferred to use the common 
law. 
Ignoring the statute, the court relied on the common law. The defense had 
denied a common law foundation, citing Blackstone228 to the effect that a 
bare menace of bodily hurt without any consequent inconvenience, such as 
damage to one's business affairs, was no injury public or private.zzg English 
common law, however, was not necessarily the law of Pennsylvania. And 
Justices Jay and Peters were concerned with Pennsylvania law. Respublica 
v. Teischer23° and Respublica v. Sweers,m both cited by Rawle,232 showed 
sufficiently that Ravara was indictable under Pennsylvania law. Du Ponceau 
maintained later that Ravara had been tried under Pennsylvania common 
law.233 Moreover, since Ravara's intended victim was a public minister, 
even though Ravara himself was not, the protection given the minister was 
necessarily rigorous. Rawle could have cited Vattel, IV.8l-82, had the 
225. 
United States v. Ravara is badly reported. The defense is represented to have taken 
the ground that the acts charged were not crimes by the common law or by any 
positive law of the United States. This was, of course, nonsense because by 
Section 27 of the Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes, offering personal 
violence to a public minister was made punishable. It was also argued by defense 
that a criminal proceeding ought not to be sustained against an individual of 
defendant's official character. 
Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 627. The citation to Section 27 should 
be Section 28. 
226. Act of April 30, 1790, I Stats. 112, 118. 
227. See text at notes 220-24 supra. 
228. William Blackstone, Commentaries, supra note 83 at iii, 120. 
229. Ravara, II F. Cas. at 714. 
230. I U.S. (I Dall.) 335 (Pennsylvania, 1788). McKean, C.J., set down the general 
principle for indictments in Pennsylvania as not founded on precedent. 
It is true, that on the examination of the cases we have not found the line accurately 
drawn but, it seems to be agreed, that whatever amounts to a public wrong may be 
made the subject of an indictment. The poisoning of chickens; cheating with false 
dice; fraudulently tearing a promissory note, and many other offenses of a similar 
description, have heretofore been indicted in Pennsylvania. 
Ibid. at 338. 
231. I U.S. (I Dall.) 41 (Pennsylvania, 1779). 
232. Ravara, II F. Cas. at 715. 
233. PeterS. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra note 190 at 35-36. Justice Washington felt 
that a violation of the Act of April 30, 1790, §28 produced 'an offence at common law'. 
United States v. Liddle, 26 F. Cas. 936, 938 (C.C.D. Pa. 1808)(No. 15,598). 
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support of the law of nations been necessary. 234 And the law of nations was 
part of the law of Pennsylvania.235 
A circular instruction issued by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson to 
district attorneys, including the District Attorney of Pennsylvania, is 
conclusive on the relevance of Pennsylvania law. The letter responded to 
French complaints about the treatment of their consuls. Jefferson asked that 
those consuls be notified that, as Goebel paraphrases the letter, 'the federal 
government would put into effect all the means of protection which the :;tate 
laws provided' .236 The easiest reading of such language is that the federal 
courts would apply state law to render justice to those classes of persons, 
including consuls, over whom the federal courts had jurisdiction. 
Ravara was thus not a prosecution under federal common law. The 
federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over all cases concerning con-
suls.237 The Judiciary Act gave the circuit courts concurrent jurisdiction 'Nith 
the Supreme Court over consuls. 238 Pennsylvania common law then dictated 
that Ravara could be indicted in state court. The deduction from these 
propositions was that the case take place in federal court, but under ~•tate 
law. Ravara was not a sinister precursor of seditious libel prosecutions. Tht: 
case caused no uproar,239 but likewise violated no constitutional principle. 
Article III personal jurisdictions240 do not carry with them plenary 
congressional legislative authority, only federal court jurisdiction over tht: 
designated persons. Consuls were not public ministers and were subject to 
the law of the country of residence. Nevertheless, since federal courts were 
to have sole jurisdiction over consuls,241 violations of state health, safety,, 
and morals regulations, normally tried as misdemeanors, had to be tried in 
federal courts. These matters were violations of state substantive law, over 
which Congress had no direct authority. 242 The federal courts had an 
234. Vattel, Law of Nations, supra note 126 at 464-66 (Bk. IV, ch.7, §§81-82). 
235. See text at note 174 supra. 
236. Julius Goebel,Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 629 (citing Charles Jenkins, <!d.,) 
Jefferson's Germantown Letters (Philadelphia, 1906) 126. 
237. U.S. Const. Art. III, §2, cl. I. For the proposition that the word 'suit' in the Judiciary 
Act can refer to both criminal and civil actions, see U.S. v. Mann, 26 F. Cas. ll53 
(C.C.D. N.H. 1812)(No. 15,718). 
238. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, §II, I Stats. at 78-79. 
239. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 56-58. 
240. U.S. Const., Art. III, §2, cl. I ('The judicial Power shall extend ... to all Cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls'). 
241. U.S. Const., Art. III, §2, cl. I; Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§9, II, I Stats. 76-79. 
242. The federal government has such authority only in the seat of government and in those 
areas purchased by the federal government with the consent of the state legislature. 
U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 17. 
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exclusive jurisdiction but could not apply federal substantive law. State law 
was the appropriate rule of decision.243 
E. U.S. v. Greenleaf 
In 1795 and soon after the conviction of Ravara, the government initiated 
prosecution against Greenleaf, editor of the New-York Journal, for libel of 
Hammond, the same British Minister that Ravara had threatened. 244 As with 
the previous cases, U.S. v. Greenleaf does not indicate the existence of a 
federal common law of crime. 
In September 1794 Hammond had complained to the United States 
Secretary of State about a defamatory article by Greenleaf in the New York 
Journal. The U.S. Attorney General thought it prima facie libellous and 
observed, in accord with but not citing Vattel,245 that the law of nations 
required that public ministers be preserved 'not only from violence but also 
from insult' .246 Goebel thought the jurisdiction might be established by 
Article III, Section 2,247 but that no attention was paid to the problem of 
common law criminal matters when the Secretary of State forwarded the 
case along for prosecution to the U.S. attorney in New York directing him 
'to proceed upon it as the law directs' .248 
Federal court utilization of state law will satisfy Goebel's worries about 
common law crimes. First amendment249 concerns would not arise for 
precisely that reason. The first amendment in terms forbids Congress from 
making laws abridging the freedom of the press. Without the assistance of 
the fourteenth amendment,250 the first amendment did not prevent the 
federal courts from applying state law restricting the press in those 
jurisdictions granted by the Constitution which nevertheless lie outside 
congressional legislative authority: cases under diversity jurisdiction and 
243. Peter S. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra note 190 at 34. See also the criticism of 
Justice Chase for refusing (to use Virginia Jaw in United States v. Callendar). Julius 
Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 651. 
244. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 629. Neither Levy nor Jay analyzes 
Greenleaf. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 276; Stewart 
Jay 'Origins of Federal Common Law', supra note 12. 
245. Vattel, Law of Nations, supra note 126 at 464-65 (Bk. IV, ch.7, §§81-82). 
246. Off. Opinions A. G. supra note 158 at i, 52-53. Goebel's quotation of the opinion is 
erroneous, but not in a way to affect his analysis. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra 
note 20 at 629. 
247. U.S. Const. Art. Ill, §2, cl. I. 
248. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 629. 
249. U.S. Const. Amend. I. 
250. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. Sec Robert C. Palmer, 'The Parameters of Constitutional 
Reconstruction', supra note 15 at 739. 
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positive regulations of consuls not related to foreign affairs.25I The case is 
also completely appropriate and justifiable under the Constitution, the 
Judiciary Act § 11 and §34, and under the circular instruction in 1793 from 
the Secretary of State. 252 Prior to Wiscart, then, the federal judiciary had 
shown no belief in a federal common law of crime. 
IV. Wiscart v. Dauchy 
Wiscart v. Dauchy,253 decided in 1796, produced a substantial change in 
prosecutions of crimes and offenses against the United States. Wis.cart 
involved not a crime or offense, but rather the extent to which the 
Constitution could be self-executing. Prior to Wiscart in the law of nations 
cases, Article III, §2's vesting of admiralty cases (followed by the Judiciary 
Act) reinforced by Article III, §2's vesting of jurisdiction over cases arising 
under the Constitution and Article I, §8, cl. lO's mention of the law of 
nations, provided a firm basis for prosecution. That conceptualization 
produced an acceptable result if state law was the rule of decision. After 
Wiscart prosecutors and justices based prosecutions on cases arising under 
the laws (not the Constitution) of the United States, but in a much mow 
tenuous way. The change involved in arguing from laws instead of from the 
Constitution was substantial. The cases following Wiscart are problematic; 
the cases before Wiscart are not. 
Wiscart v. Dauchy arose on the equity side of the circuit court in the 
Virginia district. Wiscart had fraudulently attempted to prevent a recovery 
of the amount of a prior decree by conveying away all his real and personal 
property. The circuit court found the conveyances fraudulent and awarded 
enforcement of the prior judgment for the defrauded party. Wiscart then 
obtained a writ of error to the Supreme Court. The issue was whether th~: 
determination of fact by the circuit court was binding. The Supreme Court 
held that it was binding.254 
The decision turned on the difference between an appeal and a writ of 
error. The decision construed the constitutional provision: 'In all other Cases 
before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both 
as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the 
Congress shall make. ' 255 That language could have mandated and by itself 
conveyed to the court a proper appellate procedure to permit the Supreme 
251. PeterS. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra note 190 at 33-35. 
252. See text at note 236 supra. 
253. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796). The case normally cited for the necessity of statut,~s to 
exercise jurisdiction is Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8. Turner is 
a better citation for the proposition, even though the doctrine began with the judicial 
understanding of Wiscart. 
254. Ibid. 
255. U.S. Const. Art. III §2, cl. 2. 
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Court here to have reviewed both factual and legal determinations of the 
circuit court. The Judiciary Act, however, had specified that on final 
judgments in civil suits and cases in equity a writ of error would lie. 256 A 
writ of error was different from an appeal: in error only the law could be 
reviewed. 257 
Even though Wiscart was an equity case, the court wished to establish a 
general principle about the appellate jurisdiction.258 The issue was whether 
the Judiciary Act had altered, or could alter, appellate procedure to the 
Supreme Court. Justice Wilson distinguished admiralty and maritime suits 
from suits in equity for the purposes of review. He argued that the Judiciary 
Act §22 used 'civil' in opposition to maritime and admiralty instead of in 
opposition to criminal. Thus error would lie for review in the Supreme Court 
in equity: for civil (that is, not maritime or admiralty) suits. The Judiciary 
Act thus did not provide for appellate jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime 
suits. Admiralty appellate procedure was set in the Constitution. Since 
Congress had not provided exceptions or regulations, the appeal process 
normal in maritime and admiralty law remained untouched. 259 Wilson 
argued that the constitutional provision would even have controlled an 
express congressional limitation of the appellate structure. 260 Apparently, he 
considered that Congress could except certain classes of cases from review; 
but if review was desirable, it had to be properly appellate. Wilson 
considered that portion of Article III self-executing. 261 
256. Act of September 24, 1789, §22, I Stats. 73 at 84-85. 
257. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 327. 
258. Idid. at 324: 
If causes of equity or admiralty jurisdiction are removed hither, accompanied with 
a statement of facts, but without the evidence, it is well; and the statement is 
conclusive as to all the facts, which it contains. This is unanimously the opinion 
of the court. 
If such causes are removed with a statement of the facts, and also with the 
evidence;-still the statement is conclusive, as to all the facts contained in it. This 
is the opinion of the court; but not unanimously. 
259. Ibid. at 324-27. 
260. 'Even, indeed, if a positive restriction existed by law, it would, in my judgment, be 
superseded by the superior authority of the constitutional provision.' Ibid. at 325. 
261. Self-executing is, of course, different from controlling. Self-executing means that a 
provision takes effect without statutory authorization; controlling means that a 
provision takes effect despite a statutory mandate to the contrary. The belief that there 
was self-executing jurisdiction or procedure has some support. Elbridge Gerry in the 
First Congress expounded on federal court jurisdiction. 
We are to administer this Constitution, and therefore we are bound to establish 
these courts, let what will be the consequence. Gentlemen say they are willing to 
establish Courts of Admiralty; but what is to become of the other cases to which 
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The rest of the justices, except perhaps Paterson,262 disagreed. They 
thought that the pertinent section of the Judiciary Act used 'civil actions' as 
opposed to criminal actions, so that admiralty and maritime cases of a dvil 
nature would receive review only by writ of error and not by full appeal.263 
Ellsworth read the provision not as a specification of a procedure but as a 
directive that appellate jurisdiction could only be exercised 'conformably to 
such regulations as are made by the Congress'. As long as Congress 
specified some procedure, the courts were bound to follow it only. 264 
the Continental jurisdiction is extended by the Constitution? When we have 
established the courts as they propose, have fixed the salaries, and the Supreme 
Executive has appointed the Judges, they will be independent, and no power can 
remove them; they will be beyond the reach of the Executive or Legislative pow.~rs 
of this Government; they will be unassailable by the State legislatures; nothing <:an 
affect them but the united voice of America, and that only by a change of 
Government. They will, in this elevated and independent situation, attend to their 
duty-their honor and every sacred tie oblige them. Will they not attend to the 
Constitution as well as your laws? The Constitution will undoubtedly be their first 
rule; and so far as your laws conform to that, they will attend to them, but no 
further. Would they then be confined by your laws within a less jurisdiction than 
they were authorized to take by the Constitution? You must admit them to be 
inferior courts; and the Constitution positively says, that the Judicial powers of the 
United States shall be so vested. They would then inquire what were the judic:ial 
powers of the Union, and undertake the exercise thereof, notwithstanding ~my 
Legislative declaration to the contrary; consequently their. system would bt a 
nullity, at least, which attempted to restrict the jurisdiction of the inferior comts. 
I Annals 829. 
One line of constitutional argument could dictate mandatory judicial review of any 
statute that allocated federal court jurisdiction as a whole at less than that mandat,!d by 
the Constitution, such that the court itself would allocate the jurisdictions subject to 
such subsequent regulations and exceptions of appellate jurisdictions as Congress would 
make. 
262. Paterson later indicated that he had concurred at least in part with Ellsworth. Jennings 
v. The Brig, Perseverance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336, 337; Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., 
supra note 20 at 700n. See also text supra 280. Paterson was, at least later, unwilling 
to abide by a completely common law criminal prosecution, while at the same time 
agreeing to an inherent authority by the principles of the common law to punish 
contempts. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1224. Paterson's exception for 
contempts, however, was followed by Justice Johnson in United States v. Hudson and 
Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34. The assumption that the federal courts fall heir 
to the full power to hold common law contempt proceedings is unquestioned. It might 
well be that the contempt powers of a court in a government of delegated powers ought 
to be viewed restri.ctively. 
263. Wiscart, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 327-28. 
264. 
It is observed, that a writ of error is a process more limited in its effects than an 
appeal; but, whatever may be the operation, if an appellate jurisdiction can only be 
exercised by this court conformably to such regulations as are made by the 
Congress, and if Congress has prescribed a writ of error, and no other mode, by 
which it can be exercised, still, I say, we are bound to pursue that mode, andean 
neither make, nor adopt another. The law may, indeed, be improper and 
Symposium: Federal Common Law of Crime 309 
The impact of Wiscart need not have been great. Wilson considered the 
Constitution self-executing and superior to congressional stipulations. 
Ellsworth was somewhat more deferential to Congress. But the disagree-
ment focused on different readings of the Constitution. The pertinent clause 
was not obviously self-executing: it expressly posited congressional ac-
tion.265 The court could easily have maintained, contrary to Wilson, that in 
matters touching this portion of the Constitution, it needed a statute before 
acting, without formulating a general principle that constitutional provisions 
concerning jurisdiction are not self-executing. In fact, no such principle is 
enunciated in Wiscart nor would such a general principle be appropriate. 266 
The Bill of Rights, various other amendments, constitutional restrictions on 
the states, and much of the rest of the Constitution have always been 
considered self-executing. The amendment procedure required no statute, 
nor was any statute necessary to enforce age requirements for congressional 
or executive office-holders. Public perception of a case, however, is often 
much more important than the actual holding. 267 And in this situation the 
public perception of a general principle was closely related to the holding. 
The argument here concerned admiralty jurisdiction and had considered 
self-executing provisions in relation to admiralty. Admiralty jurisdiction, 
however, had been the route by which the lower federal courts had 
constitutional, as distinct from statutory, authority over the law of nations. 
Wiscart could easily be made to apply to the law of nations cases. 
inconvenient; but it is of more importance, for a judicial determination, to 
ascertain what the law is, than to speculate upon what it ought to be. 
Ibid. at 328. 
265. Ibid. 
266. The question put by Ellsworth was whether an exception or regulation by Congress 
could swallow the rule in the Constitution; the various possibilities of language demand 
careful reading. 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those 
in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original 
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have 
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under 
such Regulations as the Congress shall make. 
U.S. Const. Art. III, §2, cl. 2. 
Federal jurisdiction is usually considered a reserve that Congress can choose to 
implement if it wants, that is, that the Constitution specifies the limit of judicial power 
but not the necessary extent. Elbridge Gerry saw the separation of powers problem here. 
See note 262 supra. And congressional discretion to limit the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts (a question distinct from distribution of the jurisdiction among different federal 
courts and regulation of procedures) makes the courts dependent on Congress. No 
intrinsic reason would demand that the courts not consider the constitutional specifi-
cation of jurisdiction binding law and an inviolable grant. U.S. Const. Art. VI, §2. 
267. See Robert C. Palmer, 'Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction', supra note 15. 
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V. Federal Practice After Wiscart 
A. Cases Arising Under Laws 
Early in 1797 the jurisdiction of the federal courts over law of nations 
offenses remained intact. William Jones, a Spanish citizen and inhabitant of 
the United States, together with several American citizens, had entered 
Florida to recapture his slaves. Upon the complaint of the minister of Spain, 
Charles Lee, as the Attorney General, gave his opinion about the legality of 
a prosecution. 268 He noted that Congress had been given the power to 
legislate on the matter of violations of territorial rights, because wch 
violations fell under the law of nations. Congress, however, had not yet 
passed such an act. Therefore, he thought, the United States could prosecute 
Jones in federal court at common law and inflict a fine and imprisonment for 
the misdemeanor, presumably under state law.269 Writing from Philadel-· 
phia, he noted that the law of nations had been made a part of the law of the 
land. 270 Lee had not yet changed his notions about federal jurisdiction over 
law of nations offenses against the United States not authorized by statute. 
Within a year after Wiscart, however, attitudes changed. William 
Cobbett, the editor of Porcupine's Gazette, printed several letters libelling 
the minister plenipotentiary of Spain. Charles Lee, the Attorney General, 
again rendered his opinion on the law.271 Although Lee was a Virginian, he 
knew Pennsylvania law because he had studied in Philadelphia. 272 His 
opinion was that Cobbett could be prosecuted in the district court of 
Pennsylvania for libel. He then defined freedom of the press, following 
Blackstone and citing Lord Mansfield, although noting that until then 'With 
respect to national concerns among ourselves, as well as with respect to 
268. Off. Opinions A. G., supra note 158 at i, 68. 
269. The opinion gives no indication what the rule of decision would be. Determinative of 
this question would be the way in which Lee read Henfield. If Lee read the cm:e as 
indicating a federal common law, he would probably not envisage application of state 
law. That conclusion is possible in early 1797, but not likely. 
The constitution gives to Congress, in express words, the power of passing a law 
for punishing a violation of territorial rights, it being an offence against the law of 
nations, and of a nature very serious in its consequences. That the peace of 
mankind may be preserved, it is the interest as well as the duty of every 
government to punish with becoming severity all the individuals of the State who 
commit this offence. Congress has passed no act yet upon the subject, and Jones 
and his associates are only liable to be prosecuted in our courts at common law for 
the misdemeanor; and if convicted, to be fined and imprisoned. The common law 
has adopted the law of nations in its fullest extent, and made it a part of the law 
of the land. 
Ibid. at 69. 
270. Ibid. 
271. I Off. Opinions A. G. supra note 158 at i, 71. 
272. Attorneys General of the United States, 1789-1979, (Washington, 1980) 6. 
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foreign nations, our presses have been unlimited and unrestrained' .273 He 
noted the role of the press in forming public opinion and thought that 
ambassadors should be protected from such affronts. The Pennsylvania 
version of freedom of the press was at this time completely in accord with 
the English version. 274 Thus far Lee's opinion was acceptable, if he was 
indeed expounding Pennsylvania law .m 
Lee then considered whether the case could be brought directly into the 
Supreme Court by virtue of its original jurisdiction.276 He quoted both the 
Constitutional provision and the Judiciary Act. The Constitution specified 
that the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction included all cases affecting 
such ministers,277 whereas the Judiciary Act gave the Supreme Court 
exclusive original jurisdiction over such public ministers in cases brought 
against them, and original but not exclusive jurisdiction in cases brought by 
them.278 The Constitution was thus broader than the statute, since a criminal 
libel prosecution of this kind would affect the ambassador (as the person 
libelled), but would not involve him as a party. Lee concluded that the 
Constitution gave the Supreme Court the 'capacity to hold criminal 
jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, which expressions compre-
hend a libel of an ambassador' but that that capacity had not been utilized.279 
273. I Off Opinions A. G., supra note 158 at i, 72. 
274. 'The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of 
man; and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being 
responsible for the abuse of that liberty.' Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790, Art. IX, 
§7, William Swinder, Sources and Documents, supra note 94 at viii, 292. 
275. See Francis Wharton, State Trials of the United States (New York, 1849) 322-29 for 
state prosecutions of Cobbett. 
276. I Off. Opinions A. G., supra note 158 at i, 73. 
277. 'The judicial Power shall extend ... to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls.' U.S. Const. Art. III,§2, cl. I. 
278. 
The Supreme Court ... shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or 
proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers or their domestics, or 
domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the law 
of nations; and original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by 
ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a consul, or vice-consul, shall 
be a party. 
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §13, I Stars., at 80-81. 
279. I Off. Opinions A. G., supra note 158 at i, 73-74. William Bradford, Attorney General, 
in 1794 rendered a superficially similar opinion concerning a riot in front of the house 
of a foreign consul. Ibid. at i, 41-43. Bradford handled the difference between 
'affecting' and the words of the Judiciary Act as a matter of construction, not as a 
matter of narrowing the constitutional mandate. Bradford found the construction of the 
Judiciary Act proper because of the further constitutional requirement that crimes be 
tried in the state where the crime occurred, an improbability if the Supreme Court were 
to have original jurisdiction in such criminal cases. U.S. Const. Art III, §3, cl. 3. A 
similar necessity for statutory actions prior to assumption of jurisdiction was evidenced 
in congressional argument, but denied by Marshall, in 1800. 10 Annals 614. 
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He then referred to Wiscart: 'At the August term, (1796) after mature 
consideration, it was determined by four judges of the Supreme Court, that, 
with regard to the judicial power of the United States granted by the 
constitution, it remains inactive and unexercisable until by law it is drawn 
into action'. 280 
Lee's summary of Wiscart was overly broad. The Supreme Court's 
appellate jurisdiction could be read to require congressional regulations, but 
its original jurisdiction is unambiguous. Moreover, the total jurisdiction of 
the federal courts possible by the Constitution, regardless of the distribution, 
could legitimately have been considered necessarily mandated. 281 Nonethe·· 
less, jurisdictional arguments based solely on Constitutional provisions 
would now seem suspect: exercise of Article III jurisdiction required some 
mediation by statute. 
B. The Counterfeiting Cases 
In 1797282 and just prior to Lee's opinion, the government prosecuted four 
counterfeiting cases that occupy a crucial place in the history of the common 
law of crime. The cases came before Ellsworth, C.J., in the circuit court for 
the Massachusetts district. Pardon Smith was indicted for counterfeiting 
bills of the Bank of the United States. 283 Congress had passed a statute 
relating to counterfeiting securities of the Bank of the United States,284 but 
none concerning bills. The case therefore was prosecuted absent a specific 
280. I Off. Opinions A. G., supra note !58 at I, 74. Lee's reference to the decision by four 
justices confirms that he was referring to Wiscart. 
281. See Gerry's comment at note 261 supra. Had Congress followed the option provid·ed in 
U.S. Const. Art. II § 2, cl. 2 and allowed the Supreme Court to appoint the justices of 
lower federal courts, that requirement of assuming the complete jurisdiction would 
seem more compelling. 
282. The traditional date for the counterfeiting cases is 1792. United States v. Smith, :~7 F. 
Cas. 1147 (C. C. D. Mass. 1792)(No. 16,323). Goebel found the records for the cases, 
and the actual date is 1797. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 630n. 
283. 27 F. Cas. at 1147. 
284. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §14, I Stats. 112, 115. The statute covered the 
counterfeiting of 'any certificate, indent, or other public security of the United States'. 
The prosecution's assumption was that a bank note was different from a security; a bank 
note was certainly different from coin. Had they identified bank notes as securitief., the 
appropriate penalty would have been death. Ibid. The decision to differentiate between 
the two was thus advantageous to the defendant. For the difference between bank notes 
and coin, see U.S. v Bowen, 24 F. Cas. (C.C.D.C. 1817)(No. 14,628). Goebel 
recognized the difference between securities and bank notes. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. 
S.C., supra note 20 at 630. Johnson, however, summarized the statute as providing 
against counterfeiting 'federal notes and currency', certainly an incorrect rendition. 
George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Hist. S.C., supra note 12 at 635. 
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statutory delegation of the crime285 and determination of punishment. The 
conceptualization of Smith's offense was derived from Wiscart. 
U.S. v. Smith was inconsistent with the law of nations cases in that it was 
conceived as a case 'arising under ... the Laws of the United States' .286 
The Bank of the United States had been established constitutionally by law. 
Problems related to the bank only arose because of that legislation, so that 
counterfeiting the bank's bills could be considered within the category of 
'Cases arising under ... the Laws of the United States' to which the judicial 
power of the United States extended. 287 Counterfeiting bills of the Bank of 
the United States was accordingly contempt of and a misdemeanor against 
the United States. And the Judiciary Act § 11 appropriated the case for the 
circuit court. 288 
The circuit court applied state law, conformable to the Judiciary Act 
§34.289 The abridged report mentions state law: 'the same offense might be 
punished as a common law cheat in the state court' .29o Blackstone's 
punishment of a common law cheat was fine, imprisonment, and pillory:291 
Smith was fined and imprisoned. Massachusetts, furthermore, had laws on 
the subject. A 1784 statute punished counterfeiting bills of the Massachu-
setts Bank by seven years hard labor. 292 That statute might not apply, 
because it concerned offenses against the Massachusetts Bank; offenses 
against the Bank of the United States were not yet possible.293 A Massa-
chusetts statute of 1785, however, prohibited forgery, including forgery of 
'any promissory note, ... warrant, order or request for the payment of 
money ... or any assurance of money or other property whatsoever' .294 
The penalties included the pillory, cropping of ears, whipping, imprisoning, 
285. The Judiciary Act, § 11 could have served as a general delegation of the crime, although 
without any specification as to punishment. 
286. U.S. Const., Art. III, §2, cl. I. Law of nations cases fall easily under the admiralty 
specification of Art. III, §2, cl. 1 or under law of nations clause in Art. I, §8. 
Counterfeiting might seem to fall easily under Art. I, §8, cl. 6, but that clause refers 
only to counterfeiting securities and coin. Extending that clause to cover bank notes 
might not work successfully. 
287. U.S. Const. Art. III, §2, cl. I. A similar argument was made in the same year in the 
Philadelphia Mayor's Court. Commonwealth v. Schaffer, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at xxix 
Appendix. 
288. 27 F. Cas. at 1147. 
289. See text at notes 187-291 supra. 
290. 27 F. Cas. at 1147. 
291. William Blackstone, Commentaries, supra note 83 at iv, 158. 
292. The First Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 190 (Wilmington, 1981). 
293. This situation is different from that in Henfield, in which state precedent was used. In 
Henfield, the state had prosecuted for an offense against Pennsylvania and the United 
States. In this situation there was no such joint precedent. See text at note 172 supra. 
294. The First Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, supra note 292 at 226. 
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and fining. 295 This statute could apply to counterfeiting bills of the Bank of 
the United States. If the statute was in affirmance of or in modification to the 
common law, the wording of the report is explicable. The desire to have it 
as a trial at common law derived from the Judiciary Act, which only applied 
to trials 'at common law' in federal courts.296 
The counterfeiting cases produce two conclusions. The courts were still 
using state law as the rule of decision in accord with the Judiciary Act §34. 
Wiscart, however, had changed the jurisdictional basis. Law of nations 
cases like Henfield had rested in part on Article III admiralty jurisdiction, 
and more remotely under the clause 'cases ... arising under this Consti-
tution' .297 Smith was based on the provision concerning 'cases ... arising 
under . . . the Laws of the United States'. In the former situation, the 
jurisdiction vested because the power was explicitly in the Constitution. In 
the latter cases, the link was more tenuous: the court only had jurisdiction 
because the offense would not have occurred but for the existence of an 
institution constitutionally established by federal law. Although jurisdiction 
was attenuated, the court still adhered to state law and had not yet opted for 
a federal common law, either as a source of jurisdiction or as a means of 
executing a delegated jurisdiction. Wiscart, however, emphasized the 
statutory basis of jurisdictions. 
C. Worrall 
In 1797 Robert Worrall attempted to bribe Tench Coxe, the Commis-
sioner of the Revenue of the United States, to obtain a contract to build the 
Cape Hatteras light house. Coxe arranged for Worrall to be apprehended, 
whereupon Worrall was indicted, tried and convicted.29s Dallas, for the 
defense, moved in arrest of judgment that the federal court did not have 
jurisdiction.299 The argument in Worrall mirrored that in Smith; the 
conjunction of the Smith argument and the Wiscart doctrine produced a 
federal common law of crime. 
Dallas argued against the circuit court's jurisdiction on the basis o:f the 
tenth amendment,300 but distinguished previous cases. In a government of 
295. Ibid. 
296. See text supra at note 187. 
297. U.S. Const., Art. III, §2, cl. I. The Philadelphia's mayor's court in 1797 recognized 
the difference between the two styles of reasoning and thus distinguished both Henfield 
and Ravara. Commonwealth v. Schaffer, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at xxxi Appendix. 
298. United States v. Worrall, 28 F. Cas. 774, 775-76 (1798). 
299. Ibid. at 776. 
300. 
It may be urged, that though the offence is not specified in the constitution, nor 
defined in any act of congress; yet, that it is an offence at common law; and that 
the common law is the law of the United States, in cases that arise under their 
authority. The nature of our federal compact will not, however, tolerate this 
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delegated powers, he argued, all powers must arise by a positive grant. Thus 
Congress could punish counterfeiting, offenses against the law of nations 
and other offenses under the necessary and proper clause. 301 Then, accept-
ing Wiscart, he maintained that even powers granted expressly 'cannot take 
effect until they are exercised through the medium of a law' .302 He 
characterized Henfield303 as a prosecution for treaty violations, and noted 
that in Ravara304 the accused's consular status required federal jurisdic-
tion. 305 
Rawle, as prosecutor, effectively refuted Dallas's arguments. He main-
tained that Henfield also concerned the law of nations. Moreover, neither the 
treaties nor Congress had defined the punishment for infractions of the 
treaty. 306 Nor could Ravara be distinguished so easily, since Rawle thought 
Congress had not defined the offense nor apportioned the punishment. 307 
Rawle thus demonstrated that Dallas could not distinguish previous cases 
sufficiently to require prior congressional definition of crimes and punish-
ments. 
Rawle based the prosecution on federal common law. Since Congress had 
established the office of Commissioner of the Revenue, attempted corrup-
tion of that officer justified prosecution, even without prior congressional 
definition. Since Worrall could not have attempted the bribe had Congress 
not created the office, such an attempt was a case arising under the laws of 
the United States. Prosecution would proceed under the principles of the 
common law or else the attempt could not be punished at all. 308 In a strict 
doctrine. The twelfth article of the amendment stipulates, that 'the powers not 
delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, 
are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people'. In relation to crimes and 
punishments the objects of the delegated power of the United States are 
enumerated and fixed .... [T]he very powers that are granted cannot take effect 
until they are exercised through the medium of a law. 
Ibid. at 777. 
The reference to the tenth amendment as the twelfth article of the amendments 
derives from the fact that twelve amendments were submitted to the states, the first two 
of which were rejected. The tenth amendment was thus the twelfth provision in the list 
submitted to the states for ratification. 
301. Ibid. at 776-77. 
302. See note 301 supra. 
303. See text at note 170 supra. 
304. See text at notes 216-19 supra. 
305. 28 F. Cas. at 778. 
306. Ibid. 
307. Ibid. 
308. 
[T]he offence was strictly within the very terms of the constitution, arising under 
the laws of the United States. If no such office had been created by the laws of the 
United States, no attempt to corrupt such an officer could have been made; and it 
is unreasonable to insist, that merely because a law has not prescribed an express 
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sense, that is probably true. State courts could not prosecute for attempted 
bribery of United States officials as such, although they could prosecute 
under a different definition of the same act. Rawle's main point, however, 
was that, if Coxe would have been liable for accepting the bribe, then the 
party offering the bribe must be similarly liable. 309 The logic is not obvious. 
Coxe was a federal officer,310 but Worrall had undertaken no obligation to 
the federal government. Nevertheless, even after Justice Chase's query, 
Rawle based the indictment only on the common law, deriving jurisdiction 
for the case as one arising under United States law. 311 
Chase ruled immediately that an indictment solely at common law was not 
sustainable. The exercise of federal jurisdiction required Congress to define 
both the crime and the punishment. He denied the existence of a federal 
common law of crime,312 but did not express an opinion on the law of 
309. 
and appropriate punishment for the offence, therefore, the offence, when com-
mitted, shall not be punished by the circuit court, upon the principles of common 
law punishment .... 
Ibid. at 778. 
District Judge Kane gives a later and different view of the situation. 
The jurisdiction of offences which are cognizable at common law resides in the 
state courts alone, even though the general government may be the pa1ty 
immediately aggrieved by the misdeed complained of. Until the year 1840 the 
congress of the United States seem to have been, in general, content with the 
protection, which the laws of the several states gave to the public property within 
their limits. The integrity of subordinates, who were not themselves entrusted with 
public money ... was guarded of course by the common law and the local statutes, 
as administered by the state courts. 
United States v. Hutchinson, 26 F. Cas. 452, 453 (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1848)(No. 15,432). 
The true point of view for considering the case, may be ascertained, by an inquiry 
whether, if Mr. Coxe had accepted the bribe, and betrayed his trust, he would not 
have been indictable in the courts of the United States? If he would be so 
indictable, upon the strongest principles of analogy, the offence of the person who 
tempted him, must be equally the subject of animadversion before the same 
judicial authority. 
28 F. Cas. at 778. 
310. Ibid. at 775. 
311. 
CHASE, Circuit Justice. Do you mean, Mr. Attorney, to support this indictment 
solely at common law? If you do, I have no difficulty upon the subject. The 
indictment cannot be maintained in this court. 
Mr. Rawle, answering in the affirmative, CHASE, Circuit Justice, stopped Mr. 
Levy, who was about to reply, in support of the motion in arrest of judgment. 
Ibid. at 778. 
312. Ibid. at 779. '[l)n my opinion, the United States, as a federal government, have no 
common law.' 
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nations. 313 Chase indicated that even a congressionally defined offense that 
omitted fixing the penalty would be insufficient. 314 Chase's radical opinion 
elicited a similarly radical response from Justice Peters. Peters made the 
classic argument for common law crimes: that every government has the 
power to protect itself from subversion. 315 He thought the federal government 
possessed the common law power to punish misdemeanors. The necessary 
independence of the federal government made reliance on state courts to 
punish offenders inappropriate. His argument was faulty, because such re-
liance on the states was one appropriate option under the Constitution.3 16 
Chase and Peters were dealing explicitly with a federal common law of 
crime: a new issue. Prior to Worrall judges had used the common law, with 
easy reference to state law as the rule of decision. 317 Chase explicated the 
differences between various states' common laws, 318 concluding that any 
federal resort to common law would thus have to be to English common law 
as such, then altered for United States conditions. 319 Chase demanded 
statutory definition; he rejected state law as the rule of decision and the 
inconsistent federal law that entailed. But his analysis created tenth 
amendment320 problems. Peters disagreed, similarly rejecting state law but 
accepting a federal common law. Analysis before Wiscart could have 
313. Ibid. 
314. 28 F. Cas. at 779. 
315. 
Whenever a government has been established, I have always supposed, that a 
power to preserve itself, was a necessary and an inseparable concomitant. 
Ibid. 
316. Robert C. Palmer, 'Liberties', supra note I. 
317. See text at notes 171-87 supra. 
318. 
[H]e who shall· travel through the different states, will soon discover, that the 
whole of the common law of England has been nowhere introduced; that some 
states have rejected what others have adopted; and that there is, in short, a great 
and essential diversity in the subjects to which the common law is applied, as well 
as in the extent of its application. 
Ibid. at 779. 
The observation is one which would derive experientially for a federal justice 
accustomed to riding circuit. The nature of the observation, however, was still 
somewhat novel. Morton J. Horwitz, Transformation, supra note 12 at 11-14; William 
E. Nelson, 'The American Revolution and the Emergence of Modern Doctrines of 
Federalism and Conflict of Laws', in Law in Colonial Massachusetts (Boston, 1984) 
432,451-54. 
319. 28 F. Cas. at 779. Dallas later carefully followed Chase's argument. 8 Annals 
2264-265 (1797). 
320. U.S. Const. Amend X. The problems concern jurisdictions like that over consuls, who 
were not public ministers. Exercising that constitutional jurisdiction without aid of the 
common law, federal or state, required legislation. But Congress had no legislative 
authority in that sphere. Chase's analysis thus logically implied the congressional 
exercise of undelegated legislative powers. 
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allowed prosecutions under the law of nations but condemned the counter-
feiting and corruption prosecutions. Wiscart, in concentrating attention on 
federal statutes for carrying jurisdiction into effect, excluded resort to state 
law as the rule of decision in federal criminal cases. 
The court wanted this new issue put into a form suitable for final 
resolution before the Supreme Court. 321 Defense counsel, however, were 
unwilling: they 'did not think themselves authorized to enter into a 
compromise of that nature'. 322 They did not specify the nature of the 
compromise. Perhaps that resolution would have required an agreed upon 
statement of facts, and Worrall preferred conviction to an admission of guilt. 
But 'compromise' would then have been a strange word to have u.sed. 
Perhaps the compromise did not involve the accused, but the law. Dalla~: had 
justified Henfield and Ravara. For resolution by the Supreme Court, he 
would have to discard his legal stance. Either he or Worrall may have 
preferred losing to what might happen in the Supreme Court. Chase's 
decision to concur with Peters sufficiently to impose the common law 
penalty on Worrall is thus explicable. 323 From Chase's point of view, altered 
by Wiscart, acknowledging Henfield would legitimize the Worrall prosecu-
tion. Chase merely left Worrall to his preferred fate. 
Worrall is identified as a watershed for Chase. 324 In 1799 Chase presided 
over a counterfeiting trial: United States v. Sylvester. 325 The case is 
unreported, but is said to have been a common law prosecution for 
counterfeiting resulting in the common law penalties of imprisonment and 
fine. 326 Chase's acquiescence to common law convictions in Worrall and 
Sylvester might indicate acceptance of a federal common law of crime. 327 As 
already shown, however, Worrall need not indicate that. 328 And Sylvester 
can be explained in other ways. If the prosecution relied on Greenleof, 329 
321. 28 F. Cas. at 780. 
322. Ibid. 
323. The traditional explanation is that Chase conferred with his fellow Supreme Court 
justices and found they agreed with Peters. Chase then changed his mind. Ibid. at 
780n.; Stephen B. Presser, 'Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 68-69. That 
explanation, however, does not account for the 'compromise' into which the lawyers 
were unwilling to enter. 
324. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 69. Note, however, that 
Johnson does not assume that Chase's views had altered at all. George Lee Haskins and 
Herbert A. Johnson, Hist. S.C., supra note 12 at 639. 
325. See Leonard Levy, Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History: Legacy 
of Suppression (New York, 1963) xv-xvi. 
326. Ibid. 
327. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 69; Leonard Levy, 
Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 278. 
328. See text at notes 321-23 supra. 
329. See text at notes 244-52 supra. 
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Chase still would not have believed in a merely inherent federal common 
law of crime. Procedure according to Greenleaf was founded on an 
extrapolation from a statute. The extrapolation was tenuous, but the 
prosecution was not based solely on inherent common law authority. 
Peters's view did not prevail, even in the short term. 330 
D. Turner 
In 1799 Ellsworth and Chase reiterated Wiscart doctrine: statutes were 
needed to exercise constitutionally allowed jurisdictions.331 Turner v. Bank 
of North America332 concerned diversity jurisdiction over an action on an 
endorsed promissory note. The issue was whether an endorsement to a 
citizen of another state would yield diversity, when the citizenship of the 
original parties to the note would not. 333 The Constitution indicated that 
diversity might result. 334 The Judiciary Act specified that it did not. m 
Rawle argued the self-executing nature of the Constitution. Since the 
Constitution granted the judicial power 
Congress can no more limit, than enlarge, the constitutional grant. In the second section 
of the third article, the constitution contemplates the parties to the controversy, as alone 
raising the question of jurisdiction; and if the existing controversy is 'between the 
citizens of different states', the judicial power of the United States expressly extends to 
it.336 
For Rawle, the Article III §2 specification that the judicial power 'shall 
extend' to various matters was effective. 
330. Historical opinion would have indicated that Peters's view did prevail. Stephen B. 
Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 68-70; Leonard Levy, Emergence of 
a Free Press, supra note 12 at 278. In United States v. Williams, Ellsworth did 
comment that 'the common law of this country remains the same as it was before the 
Revolution'. 29 F. Cas. 130 (C.C.D. Conn. 1799)(No. 17,708). Williams, however, 
was similar to Henfield, except that the accused had officially, but without U.S. 
consent, become a French citizen prior to engaging in warfare. Williams also raised his 
expatriation as a defense, so that the use of a common law standard is rather different 
here from using the common law as a source of jurisdiction. Leonard Levy cites 
Williams as if it were relevant to seditious libel. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free 
Press, supra note 12 at 277. 
331. See text at notes 282-85 supra. 
332. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799). Turner, not Wiscart, is normally cited as the origin of the 
doctrine. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 439, 449 (1850). 
333. Turner, 4 U.S. at II. 
334. Controversies 'between Citizens of different States' would on its face include con-
troversies between an original party and an endorsee of a different state. U.S. 
Const. Art. III, §2, cl. I. 
335. Act. of Sept. 24,1789, ch. 20, §II. 
336. 4 U.S. at 10. 
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Ellsworth preferred prior statutory authorization, and queried Rawk on 
the impact of his argument. 337 Chase was even more explicit. 
Chase, Justice. The notion has frequently been entertained, that the federal courts derive 
their judicial power immediately from the constitution; but the political truth is, that the 
disposal of the judicial power (except in a few specified instances) belongs to Congress. 
If Congress has given the power to this court, we possess it, not otherwise; and if 
Congress has not given the power to us, or to any other court, it still remains at the 
legislative disposal. Besides, Congress is not bound, and it would, perhaps, be 
inexpedient, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts, to every subject, in every 
form, which the constitution might warrant. 338 
Neither Ellsworth nor Chase advocated a federal common law. They both 
showed much more deference to the legislative branch.339 
E. The Alien and Sedition Acts 
In 1798, after two seditious libel prosecutions had been initiated at 
common law, Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts. 34° Creating 
distrust of the federal government thus became a criminal offense. The 
Federalists used the Sedition Act to attack congressmen and newspapers in 
Republican states. 341 Both the Republicans342 and some states343 protested. 
337. 'How far is it meant to carry this argument? Will it be affirmed, that in every ca.se, to 
which the judicial power of the United States extends, the federal courts may exercise 
a jurisdiction, without the intervention of the Legislature, to distribute, and regulat1:, 
the power?' 4 U.S. at JOn. The problem Ellsworth raises is real, but so likewise is the 
problem that Gerry raised. See note 261 supra. It could easily be argued that the 
independence of the judiciary and its balancing function demanded that all the 
jurisdiction possible via the Constitution be located in some federal court, and that that 
principle would supersede the separation of powers concerns. Congress cou!d, of 
course, then regulate if it was dissatisfied. 
338. 4 U.S. at JOn. 
339. Ellsworth was one of the principal drafters of the Judiciary Act. Clark Warren, 'New 
Light', supra note 12 at 50. It is completely possible that the original version of H9 and 
II, including the limiting clause 'and defined by the laws of the same' was his work, 
but defeated in passage. As justice he would then be seen as insisting on the prior action 
of Congress once more. Paterson, however, was also one of the principal drafters. Ibid. 
He had sided with Wilson in Wiscart, so that one would expect that he was not as 
deferential to the legislative branch. See text at note 262 supra. 
340. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, I Stats. 596. 
341. George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Hist. S.C., supra note 12 at 638-39. 
342. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 280; James Morton Smith, 
Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Ithaca, 
1956). 
343. 'Instructions from the General Assembly of Virginia to the Senators from that Slate in 
Congress, January II th, 1800', reprinted in PeterS. Du Ponceau, Dissertation, supra 
note 190 at 225-26. 
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The prosecutions created widespread distrust of the Federalists and were a 
significant factor in Jefferson's election.344 The public response to govern-
mental suppression of criticism made it difficult to argue later in favor of a 
federal common law of crime.345 
The common law prosecutions for seditious libel that preceded the 
Sedition Act are obscure. Neither prosecution resulted in a trial. Benjamin 
Franklin Bache, editor of the Aurora, died; Burke, editor of the Time Piece, 
fled the country. 346 Peters's well-known comments in Worrall make it likely 
that the prosecutions were founded on a federal common law of crime. 347 
The prosecution of Bache at least might have succeeded, since Peters would 
have been the judge.348 
Congress was dissatisfied with such common law prosecutions. They 
passed the Sedition Act not simply to alter common law rules, 349 but to 
satisfy the justices with a statute. Wiscart doctrine determined that proper 
common law jurisdiction would not find favor with most of the Supreme 
Court. Ellsworth and Chase were still certainly of that opinion in August of 
1799, when they queried Rawle in Turner. 350 The emphasis on basing 
jurisdiction on laws of the United States, thus on statutory authority, had 
reached Congress; Marshall argued against such ideas in Congress.35I The 
statute was necessary not just to modify the role of the jury and add truth as 
a defense, but to prosecute successfully. The prosecutions of Bache and 
Burke may, indeed, have only been harassment, useful until the statute was 
passed.352 
The passage of the statute allayed the court's legal qualms. They found 
first amendment freedom of speech and press no problem. The alterations 
of state constitutions353 and the consistency of state practice provided a 
model that many found attractive. 354 Moreover, Worrall had involved the 
344. Stephen B. Presser, 'A Tale of Two Judges', supra note 12 at 97, 104-105. 
345. George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Hist. S.C., supra note 12 at 638-41. 
346. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 277. 
347. Julius Goebel, Jr., Hist. S.C., supra note 20 at 632-33. 
348. Ibid. at 632; Leonard Levy, 'On the Origins of the Press Clause', supra note 12 at 205, 
217. 
349. Ibid. at 634-35. Leonard Levy remains perplexed by the felt need for a statute, thinking 
the common law would suffice. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 
12 at 298. 
350. Turner v. Bank of America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at IOn. 
351. 10 Annals 614 (1799). 
352. A similar situation seems to have arisen under Jefferson: Leonard Levy, Emergence of 
a Free Press, supra note 12 at 343-46. 
353. See text at note 274 supra. 
354. Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, supra note 12 at 304-305. 
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need of a statute. 355 Regardless of the Judiciary Act and its deference to state 
law, 356 theory now emphasized the independence of the federal government 
and the desirability of uniform federal practice. Both concerns indicated a 
preference for federal instead of state law, and Wiscart demanded statutory 
instead of common law jurisdictions.357 
United States v. Hudson and Goodwin358 in 1812 carried these demands 
to their natural conclusion: there was no federal common law of crime. The 
court formulated the rule in the broadest possible language. Hudson was a 
seditious libel prosecution. Against Justice Story's continued objections, the 
court thereafter applied the rule also in admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tions.359 Story's argument was overly expansive, since he would have 
included all offenses against the sovereign and against public rights, justice, 
peace, trade and police,360 without considering first amendment implica-
tions. But as to the main point, he was correct. The Judiciary Act had not 
delegated jurisdiction only over specifically defined offenses.36I Moreover, 
the language of Article I, §8, cl. 10 indicated what Marshall had argued in 
1799:362 that Congress could modify the law of nations, but need not 
legislate it entirely before court enforcement. 
355. See text at notes 312-20 supra. 
356. See text note 62 supra. 
357. See text at notes 253-67 supra. 
358. II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32. 
359. Story already was involved between 1812 and 1816 with federal common law. In 
United States v. Clark he felt bound by but protested the decision in Hudson, ruling that 
that case precluded a federal common law relative to perjury. 25 F. Cas. 441 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1813)(No. 14,804). In United States v. Coolidge he argued from the Judiciary 
Act§ II, as would Charles Warren ('New Light', supra note 12 at 73), that Congress 
had not restricted the courts to specifically defined offences. 25 F. Cas. 619 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1813)(No. 14,857). He argued there that admiralty matters presented the 
strongest case for a federal common law. Ibid. at 620. He was correct at least in that. 
Story's opinion there was reversed by the Supreme Court without argument although 
the court was divided; the government declined to argue the case and no counsel 
appeared for the defendant. 14 U.S. (I Wheaton) 415, 416. In 1812 Story voiced his 
opinion (following Tilghman in United States v. Conyngham: 25 F. Cas. 599 (C.C.D. 
Pa. 180I)(No. 14,850)) concerning §34 in non-criminal matters. United States v. 
Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812)(No. 16,750). Story was, even for 
himself, abnormally prescient in Wonson, since the report has him citing, in 1812, his 
1842 decision in Swift v. Tyson (41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842)). Ibid. at 749. Modt::rn 
justices have prudently abstained from this practice. Story reiterated his opinion at 
length then in United States v. Hoar. 26 F. Cas. 329 (C.C.D. Mass. 182I)(No. 
15,373). 
360. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. at 620. 
361. See note 359 supra and text at notes 49-61 supra. 
362. Sec note 64 supra. 
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VII. Conclusion 
323 
Historical optmon has held that Congress and the first generation of 
justices believed in a federal common law of crime. The most typical 
expression of the common law of crime was seditious libel. Such an 
acceptance of common law authority dictated that expansive notions of first 
amendment freedoms of speech and press could not rest on original intent, 
because the First Congress as the body that drafted the first amendment and 
the first judges approved by that Congress must be presumed to have acted 
and thought in line with the measures they proposed. That scholarly tradition 
has obscured the early consensus on the limited nature of the federal 
government. 
Careful examination of the Judiciary Act and the early cases yields a 
different picture. The Judiciary Act did not envisage a general federal 
common law of crime. Although not explicit, the Judiciary Act had 
delegated to the federal courts a jurisdiction over offenses under admiralty 
and maritime law according to the law of nations. The justiCes had no 
problem perceiving that intent and applied state law as the rule of decision 
in such criminal cases except when otherwise mandated by Constitution, 
statute, or treaty. No evidence survives of an expansive notion of common 
law jurisdiction among the justices prior to Wiscart. 
Wiscart called into question early ideas of a self-executing jurisdiction. 
Except perhaps for the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, jurisdic-
tion must be established by statute. An independent federal common law 
was thus problematic. In Worrall, Justice Chase posed the additional 
problem squarely as to the precise rules to be adopted. As between state and 
federal common law, consistency dictated the latter; but Wiscart doctrine 
rejected that possibility. Application of state criminal common law in the 
Worrall situation would have been inappropriate anyway, since it was 
outside the admiralty and maritime subject matter: §9 and § 11 of the 
Judiciary Act were an insufficient foundation. But the Wiscart emphasis on 
statutes necessitated the passage of the Sedition Act instead of permitting 
common law prosecutions. Hudson was thus a foregone conclusion; 
Coolidge, relating to admiralty law, was not. 
Within the first decade after ratification of the Constitution, some 
legislators and some justices believed in federal jurisdiction over offenses 
not previously defined by statute. Few of those, however, advocated a 
general federal common law of crime. Even Peters's remarks came after 
Wiscart and do not indicate the views of legislators or justices before 1796. 
Analysis of first amendment speech and press can proceed without the 
vexation of the supposed initial acceptance of a federal common law of 
crime. Moreover, this perception of early legislative and judicial views 
confirms that at least at the beginning there was a strong consensus in the 
government that the federal government was different in kind from state 
governments and had a more limited mandate. 

